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ABSTRACT  
 
 
The Specific Allocation Fund (DAK): Mechanism and Uses  
 
 
This study aims to analyze the management of the Specific Allocation Fund (DAK). The 
three largest DAK-recipient sectors are the focus of the study: education, health, and roads 
infrastructure. The study sample areas are four districts. This paper was compiled based on 
the results of in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with various stakeholders as 
well as analysis of DAK policy and secondary data.  
 
The main objective of DAK is to reduce interregional inequalities in public services. We 
came across policies in dire need of national uniformity but that still allow variation on 
some aspects. Conversely, we found some enforced national uniformity in policies that 
should have provided rooms for variations to accommodate regional specific conditions. In 
practice, regional governments have become passive recipients of DAK grants. The 
attitudes of regional government towards the DAK allocation process indicate a general 
feeling that the central government is not transparent. Furthermore, it is evident that 
coordination and communication surrounding DAK management between agencies are 
still limited.  
 
Based on the above findings, we recommend a new paradigm where the central government is 
suggested to decentralize the authority for the allocation, coordination, and monitoring of 
district/city use of DAK to provincial governments.  
 
Keywords: specific allocation fund, education, health, roads infrastructure, new paradigm 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
This study, which was conducted from April 2007 to January 2008, aims to analyze the 
management mechanisms of the Specific Allocation Fund (DAK) from its regulation and 
allocation processes down to responsibility for its use. The three largest DAK-recipient 
sectors are the focus of the study: education, health, and road infrastructure. Three districts 
(kabupaten) and one city (kota) were purposively selected as the study sample regions: 
Kabupaten Kupang, Kabupaten Wonogiri, Kabupaten Gorontalo, and Kota Banda Aceh. 
This report was compiled based on the results of in-depth interviews and focus group 
discussions (FGDs) with various stakeholders as well as research on DAK policy and an 
analysis of secondary data. 
 
Generally, DAK is similar to the Presidential Instruction (Inpres) Fund, which were 
developed under the New Order administration. DAK is allocated in the national budget 
(APBN) to fund various specific development activities implemented in and by the regions. 
It aims to reduce interregional inequalities in public services and increase regional 
government responsibility for the mobilization of their resources. Although DAK is a part 
of the regional budget (APBD), regional governments must abide by various central 
regulations governing its use, such as laws, government regulations, presidential decrees, 
ministerial regulations and decrees, and circulars from director-generals in each ministry 
that receives a DAK allocation. Under the weight of so many central regulations, very few 
regional governments have made their own regulations to detail policies covering DAK 
management.  
 
The research into legislative regulation found that as yet there are no government 
regulations that specifically regulate DAK as is mandated by the law.1 To date, no 
government regulation has been issued regarding the staged transfer of deconcentration 
and co-administration (tugas pembantuan) funds to DAK. In addition, various centralistic 
regulations regarding the organization as well as tasks and functions of ministries and 
nonministerial institutions have not been adjusted to conform with the decentralization and 
regional autonomy legislation. Consequently, DAK management policies differ between 
departments and regions. SMERU also came across policies in dire need of national 
uniformity but that still allow variation on some aspects. Conversely, SMERU found some 
enforced national uniformity in policies that should have provided room for variation to 
accommodate regional, local, or other specific conditions. 
 
Many parties in the regions consider that the central government is often late releasing 
regulations concerning DAK, clashing with regional planning timetables. When the content 
of late-issued central decisions differs from the estimations a region has used when 
preparing their APBD, the APBD must be revised and later reassessed by the regional 
house of representatives (DPRD). Apart from wasting the time of government apparatus, 
this process wastes a significant amount of funds, stretching the regions’ already limited 
fiscal capacity.   
 
 
 
                                                
1The government regulation that regulates DAK is bundled with the government regulation generally dealing 
with balance funds (dana perimbangan). DAK is one component of balance funds. 
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In practice, regional governments have become passive recipients of DAK grants, 
notwithstanding the legislation that actually enables the regions to actively submit 
proposals. Thus far, regional governments are only tasked to send data concerning regional 
conditions of facilities and infrastructure in the sectors that receive DAK allocations. The 
central government (specifically the Ministry of Finance) then uses that data as a 
determinant for the allocation of DAK by sector and region. Aside from that, the 
determination of the sectors that are to receive a DAK allocation follows the development 
priorities laid out in the government work plan (RKP). In 2007, DAK was allocated to 
seven administrative service sectors: education, health, infrastructure, regional governance 
infrastructure, maritime affairs and fisheries, agriculture, and the environment. General, 
specific, and technical criteria are used to determine DAK allocation. After a region’s DAK 
value has been calculated, the regional government distributes the allocations to various 
projects and activities in accordance with central government policy.  
 
Until 2005, the proportion of DAK allocation to the total APBN expenditure was still 
below 1%. In 2006, the proportion increased almost two-fold to 1.7%, or Rp11.6 trillion, 
while the General Allocation Fund (DAU) accounted for almost 22% of the total APBN 
expenditure. In the same year, deconcentration and co-administration funds totaled more 
than Rp30 trillion, or 4.4% of the total APBN expenditure. If a portion of deconcentration 
and co-administration funds is transferred to DAK as has been regulated in Law No. 
33/2004 Article 108, over the next few years, the proportion of DAK to the total APBN 
expenditure could reach 5%. Since 2003, the three administrative services sectors that have 
received the largest proportion of DAK have been education, health, and infrastructure, 
specifically road infrastructure.  
 
The attitudes of regional governments towards the DAK allocation process indicate a 
general feeling that the central government is not transparent, to the point where regions 
need to “lobby Jakarta” in order to receive larger allocations. News of the existence of 
“calo anggaran”, or budget brokers, in recent times has strengthened the indications of 
opaque DAK allocation practices. The bupati (district heads) and heads of DAK-receiving 
regional offices conduct lobbying efforts, and in fact one regional government handed the 
assignment over to a private company. Analysis results of the accuracy of DAK allocations 
for regions show that the correlation signs of DAK allocation by province on the condition 
of public service infrastructure in the basic education and road infrastructure are in line 
with the DAK objectives; however, the correlation values are low. In the health sector, the 
correlation sign is even contrary to the DAK objectives. This indicates that in allocating 
DAK to regions, the central government has given some consideration to factors that are 
not directly related with the infrastructure conditions of the sectors in question. 
 
It is evident that coordination and communication surrounding DAK management 
between agencies at the central level and the regional level, including both provincial and 
district/city levels, are still limited. Thus far, very few regional governments have fulfilled 
their obligations to report their use of DAK quarterly. There are four possible causes for 
this: (i) while the regulations provide sanctions for not reporting, the central government 
has not applied the sanctions; (ii) several regional governments that have submitted reports 
have not received any response from the central government, and consequently, the 
regional governments are no longer concerned about their reporting obligations;  (iii) the 
sanctions for failing to report would be applied to the region, not the negligent official, and 
correspondingly, officials do not feel obliged to compile the report; and/or (iv) regional 
governments do not have the sufficient capacity to manage public finances. 
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Based on the above findings, SMERU recommend the following recommendations to 
improve the policies and implementation of the use of DAK. 
 
(1) Various regulations must be reformed in order to support the proper implementation 
of decentralization and regional autonomy in general and DAK management 
specifically. This would optimalize efforts to balance the quality and quantity of public 
services throughout Indonesia. 
 
(2) A number of new paradigms are required for the management of DAK. These would 
decentralize the authority for the allocation, coordination, and monitoring of 
district/city use of DAK to provincial governments. This authority requires 
safeguarding regulations to guarantee the implementation of transparency and 
participation mechanisms, accountability procedures, and a reward and punishment 
system. Such a policy would have three benefits: (i) the simplification of DAK 
management at the central level, (ii) the strengthening of governors’ authority as 
representatives of the central government in the regions, and (iii) the empowerment of 
provinces as autonomous regions through fiscal discretion. 
 
(3) Sanctions should be devised for bureaucrats, not regions or the populace as a whole, 
for bureaucratic failures in the management of DAK in particular and of regional fiscal 
matters in general. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Entering the era of decentralization, otherwise known as “big-bang decentralization” from 
2001, the central government has played an important role in supporting the 
implementation of administrative affairs which have been decentralized to regional 
government (pemda). Particularly in matters of finance, the central government has the 
responsibility to maintain balance in interregional funds allocation. In order to succeed in 
this task, the central government transfers funds to the regions via several mechanisms, 
such as General Allocation Fund (DAU), Specific Allocation Fund (DAK), and Shared 
Revenue Fund (DBH). These three balance funds have differing aims and natures.2 They 
are all channeled into the regional budget (APBD), and hence, regional governments must 
justify their management of the funds to the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD). 
Besides that, the central government also provides loans and assistance to regional 
governments. The aim of the funds transfer, just like the purpose of the central 
government’s fiscal policy in the framework of the implementation of regional autonomy, 
includes to reduce financial discrepancies between the center and the regions as well as 
between regions and to reduce interregional discrepancies in public services provision. To 
date, balanced funds are still the largest source of regional revenue. In 2006, total transfers 
to the regions nominally increased by 47% compared to the previous year.3  
 
DAU is a block grant; hence, regional governments are free to make use of the funds without 
interference from the central government. Funds for the DBH are sourced from APBN 
income which is reallocated to the (producer) regions in shares as regulated by Law (UU) No. 
33/2004. DBH is distributed as taxation DBH (DBH Pajak) and natural resources DBH (DBH 
Sumber Daya Alam). Taxation DBH consists of land and building tax (PBB), land and building 
transfer fees (BPHTB), and personal income tax (PPh). Natural resources DBH is comprised 
of forestry, mining, fisheries, oil, natural gas, and geothermal revenues.  
 
In contrast to DAU and DBH, the acquisition and use of DAK must follow the guidelines 
determined by the central government. DAK is allocated to specific regions in the national 
budget to fund specific activities that are of regional affairs and reflect national priorities. 
Regions can receive DAK on fulfillment of three criteria: (1) general criteria based on the 
Net Fiscal Index (NFI); (2) specific criteria based on legislative regulation and regional 
characteristics; and (3) technical criteria based on technical indexes in the relevant industry 
(Law No. 32/2004 and Law No. 33/2004).  
 
Approximately 80% of regionally managed DAU is used for routine expenditure, mainly 
the wages of regional government public servants. Because of this, DAK is the main 
regional source for infrastructure construction. If well managed, DAK, which is specifically 
used for building and revitalizing physical infrastructure, can improve the quality of 
education, increase health services, and at the very least reduce infrastructural damage. 
These efforts are of paramount importance for overcoming poverty and building a more 
competitive national economy. 
                                                
2‘Pelaksanaan Kegiatan Analisis dan Pengolahan Data Pelaksanaan Dana Alokasi Khusus (DAK)’ [The 
Implementation of Analysis and Data Management Activities in the Implementation of the Specific 
Allocation Fund (DAK)], Directorate of Regional Economy, Bappenas, 2006 
3Nota Keuangan 2007 [2007 Financial Statement], Ministry of Finance, 2007 
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DAK recipient regions are obliged to provide co-funding (dana pendamping) from the APBD 
amounting to a minimum of 10% of the total DAK they receive. Exceptions can be 
granted to regions with low fiscal capacity. Regions are also obliged to provide 3% of the 
total value of the received DAK for general costs taken from other sources of income. 
DAK is used to close interregional gaps in public services provision, with priority given to 
education, health, infrastructure, maritime affairs and fisheries, agriculture, regional 
administrative infrastructure, and the environment. In 2006 the central government 
allocated as much as Rp11.6 trillion to DAK and in 2007 the figure rose sharply to 
Rp17.094 trillion.4 Starting from 2007, deconcentration funds and co-administration (tugas 
pembantuan) funds used in the regions will be disbursed to regions via the DAK mechanism 
in stages; deconcentration funds will be allocated to provinces while co-administration 
funds may be allocated to provinces, districts (kabupaten), or cities (kota) as representatives 
of the central government in the regions. In contrast to DAU, DBH, deconcentration 
funds, and co-administration funds, DAK is specifically given to districts or cities. 
 
To date, the focus of study has often been efforts to optimize revenue sources, while 
studies on the optimization of expenditure focuses are rarely conducted. Studies of the 
implementation and impact of DAK, for example, are rare. Linked to this, questions that 
frequently emerge are concerning simple things like how the distribution mechanisms and 
management of DAK are proceeding. Although there are several criteria for the allocation 
of DAK, the accountability processes at the national and regional levels have not yet been 
widely publicized. 
 
 
1.2 Aim and Scope 
 
This research, which was conducted from April 2007 to January 2008, aims to study 
various policies related to the management of DAK and their implementation in the field, 
including 
 
(1) studying the mechanisms and formulation/criteria of DAK at the central government 
level in relation to  
(a) regulations connected with DAK which have become guidelines for implementers 
(planning, allocation determination procedures, fund disbursement mechanisms, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and coordination between agencies); 
(b) the allocation of other funds which have the same or similar aims to DAK;  
(c) the role of various agencies (the National Development Planning Board 
(Bappenas), Ministry of Finance (Depkeu), Ministry of Home Affairs (Depdagri), 
the Technical Ministry of the Ministry of National Education (Depdiknas), Ministry 
of Health (Depkes), Ministry of Public Works (Deppu) in the management of 
DAK (involving bottom-up planning versus top-down planning, allocation 
determination, disbursement and use of funds, and responsibilities); 
(d) how much and to where funds are allocated (sectoral, regional, type of project, project 
implementation methods, and conformity to legislative regulations); and  
(e) problems and suggestions for moving forward; 
 
                                                
4Minister for Finance Regulation (PMK) No. 124/PMK.02/2005 and PMK No. 128/PMK.07/2006 
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(2) studying the regional government’s capacity in the use of DAK in relation to  
(a) methods and efforts to obtain funds; 
(b) regional regulations and policies involving the administration of DAK; 
(c) the regional government’s experiences in making use of other funds having aims 
that are the same as or similar to those of DAK; 
(d) the role of various regional agencies (Regional Development Planning Board 
(Bappeda), Provincial House of Representatives (DPRD), Finance Division, 
Technical Agency, and regional offices of the Directorate-General for Treasury 
(Kanwil DJP) in the management of DAK (involving planning, use, monitoring, 
responsibilities, and conformity to regulations and policies); 
(e) the disbursement procedures and processes (from the APBN to APBD, co-
funding, distribution to projects, and conformity to regulations and policies);  
(f) the amount of funds received for what project (basis for the choice, allocation, and 
location for each project, project management: contractor versus self-managed, and 
conformity to regulations and policies);  
(g) project quality; and 
(h) obstacles and suggestions for moving forward.  
 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
This study qualitatively analyzed the current DAK funding, various problems that have 
emerged in its distribution, and regulation of the use of DAK both at the central and 
regional levels. It is focused on the three sectors that receive the greatest amount of DAK 
funding: education, health, and road infrastructure. Information regarding stakeholder 
perceptions was gathered at both the central and regional levels, concentrating on efforts to 
increase the management accountability of DAK. A qualitative approach was also used to 
uncover DAK’s regulatory and implementational framework, information transparency, 
receipt and use of funds, and various obstacles and their possible solutions. The study also 
used a quantitative approach to see the proportion of DAK in both the APBN and APBD, 
the proportion of DAK compared to other balance funds, and DAK trends in the APBN 
and APBD, particularly in the span of the last five years. A quantitative analysis was also 
done to correlate DAK allocation with the condition of public service infrastructure in 
each province.  
 
The research sample areas covered one district or city in each of four provinces. Sample 
areas were selected based on criteria such as 
(1) representativeness of all regions in Indonesia: Sumatra, Java–Bali, Kalimantan–
Sulawesi, and Nusa Tenggara–Maluku–Papua;  
(2) the sample provinces being DAK recipients and being the provinces that receive the 
largest DAK allocations among the provinces in their respective areas;  
(3) variations in the regional economic growth figures and gross regional domestic product 
(GRDP); 
(4) covering districts and cities, that is, three districts and one city; and 
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(5) sample districts/city being DAK recipients for all priority sectors and being the 
districts/city receiving the largest DAK allocations among all the districts/cities in 
their respective provinces. 
 
Table 1.1  DAK Study Sample Areas, 2007 
Area Province District/City 
Sumatra Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) Banda Aceh City 
Java–Bali Central Java Wonogiri District 
Kalimantan–Sulawesi Gorontalo Gorontalo District 
Nusa Tenggara–Maluku–Papua* East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) Kupang District 
*As a province that has a special autonomy, Papua has different characteristics from other provinces in this area. 
However, since the research’s funding is limited, this area is only represented by NTT. 
 
Data and information were collected in a document review covering all legislative 
regulations issued by the central government and regional governments at the provincial 
and district/city levels. National and regional budgets since the beginning of the 
decentralization period were also compiled. In-depth interviews were conducted with 
national-level officials from the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Finance, Bappenas, 
and the House of Representatives (DPR), as well as several officials from technical 
ministries in DAK priority sectors, specifically the Ministry of National Education, Ministry 
of Finance, and Ministry of Public Works. In-depth interviews were also conducted with 
provincial and district/city officials, as well as with stakeholders in the use of development 
projects funded by DAK. 
 
 
 
    Banda Aceh City                                                                               Gorontalo District 
 
                                    Wonogiri District              Kupang District 
 
Figure 1.1  Map of Indonesia and Research Locations 
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Regional stakeholders interviewed include officials from Bappeda, education offices, 
health offices, public works offices, finance and economy divisions of regional 
secretariates, regional offices of the Directorate-General for Treasury under the Ministry 
of Finance,5 DPRD representatives, principals of DAK-recipient schools, contractors 
(Indonesian Association of Construction Contractors/Gapensi), boards of education, 
nongovernment organizations, community health centre (puskesmas) heads, the mass 
media, and users. Information was also gathered via focus group discussions (FGDs) 
attended by officials from all regional governments and other connected agencies 
responsible for policies and the implementation of DAK’s use. 
 
 
1.4 Report Structure 
 
Chapter I is an introductory chapter outlining the background, aims and scope of the study, 
methodology, and report structure. Chapter II will explain the regulations related to DAK, 
covering from planning to accountability. Chapter III will explain DAK allocations in the 
APBN and APBD, DAK allocations according to priority sectors, and DAK allocations in 
the sample areas. Chapter IV looks at transparency, accountability, and participation in the 
use of DAK, mainly by the regions. Finally, Chapter V will emphasize several important 
notes about the research, provide a summary, and present several recommendations.  
 
 
                                                
5The only prospective respondent that refused to be interviewed was the head of Regional Office of the 
Directorate-General of Treasury, Region I, Banda Aceh. 
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II. REGULATIONS: FROM PLANNING TO 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 
In more than half a century after independence, Indonesia’s system of governance has 
tended to be managed centrally. In this system, everything related to administrative matters 
was planned and regulated by the central government. Regional governments had the task 
of implementing everything that was decided and ordered by the central government. An 
argument that often emerged on the back of the centralistic system was to achieve national 
unity for the Republic of Indonesia. However, for a country as large as Indonesia with tens 
of thousands of islands, containing hundreds of ethnicities, and a population of more than 
220 million people, a centralized administrative system cannot effectively regulate and 
implement all administrative matters by itself. The centralistic system will dominate if 
monitoring mechanisms by the public and accountability to the public are weak and not 
open. This system is inclined to create an increasingly large and complex bureaucracy. A 
bureaucracy that continues to grow, at a certain point, will no longer be able to service and 
settle governance matters. Instead, it will become the source of problems. 
 
As one member of the DPR stated, “Negara dibangun dengan tujuan demi kesejahteraan 
penduduknya. NKRI bukan tujuan, melainkan sarana untuk mencapai tujuan tersebut” [A nation is 
built for the sake of the welfare of its people. National unity of the Republic of Indonesia is 
not the aim, but rather it is a tool to achieve this aim].6 Because of this, when the monetary 
crisis occurred and was prolonged by political uncertainty, several community groups 
demanded democratization in various aspects of national life, including opposing the 
centralized governance which had been hiding behind the justification of maintaining 
national unity. These efforts included a push for the decentralization of authority and fiscal 
matters. The decentralization system gave regions the authority to manage their own 
household with regional autonomy status. An early result from the push for these changes 
came with the founding of Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Governance and Law No. 
25/1999 on Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and Regional Administrations 
which came into effect on 1 January 2001. In 2004, these two laws were revised with Law 
No. 32/2004 and Law No. 33/2004 respectively.  
 
Based on these two laws, district/city governments are authorized and have the 
responsibility to provide wide ranging public services in almost all sectors of community 
life.7 These legislative regulations have made the framework for fiscal management 
relationships which were previously dominated by the center through Regional Autonomy 
Subsidies (SDO) and Presidential Instruction (Inpres) Funds more flexible under DAU and 
DAK. Generally, DAU replaces SDO for civil servant wages and governance activities, 
while DAK replaces the Inpres Fund by funding various specific activities in and by the 
regions. This chapter focuses on highlighting the dynamics of policy regulations (legislative 
regulations), mainly covering the allocation, distribution, and use of DAK. 
                                                
6Interview on 17 April 2007  
7This system is not actually a new policy. Indonesia has had Government Regulation No. 45/1992 on the 
Implementation of Regional Autonomy Focussing on Level II Regions and was trialled via Government 
Regulation No. 8/1995 on the Granting of Several Governmental Affairs to 26 Sample Level II Regions. The 
implementation of these government regulations did not eventuate as the delegation of administrative matters 
to regional governments was not fully supported by the distribution of funding, while various large sources of 
national income were controlled by the central governement (Usman et al. 1996). 
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2.1 Observation of Funds with Similar Purposes (Presidential 
Instruction Fund)  
 
The New Order government, aside from being known as having a high-growth economic 
strategy, also had a poverty reduction strategy. In the New Order era, the central 
government generally transferred funds to regional governments in two types of grants: 
firstly, general grants, in the form of SDO, which were allocated to fulfill regional needs 
and were only to be used in accordance with central government directives; and secondly, 
specific grants, in the form of the Inpres Fund, which were allocated to fulfill specific 
regional needs and were implemented and monitored by the center.8 Both of these types of 
grants were intended to reduce interregional inequality and raise regional government 
responsibility for the mobilization of regional resources (World Bank 2003). 
 
The specific grants were channeled to regional development in various forms, such as 
through specific Inpres on primary schools, health, reforestation, villages, left-behind 
villages, level II regions (districts/cities), and level I regions (provinces). These various 
Inpres show that the government used a regional approach as well as a sectoral approach in 
the allocation of funds. The Inpres program had a key role in providing and widening 
community access to goods and services for basic human needs. As a result, while at the 
beginning of the New Order the poverty rate was no less than 60%, after three decades of 
the government, based on the 1996 national socioeconomic survey (Susenas), the rate had 
fallen to only around 11% (Suara Pembaruan 1997). 
 
Before the decentralization era, Indonesia submitted to a national financial system that 
enabled the center to control large and productive income sources without returning 
anything to the producer region. This system pushed the large-scale, wide-open access to 
the allocation of funds to ministries and nondepartmental institutions (Simanjuntak 2005), 
while the regions mostly only managed income sources with a value approaching their 
collection costs. The high extent of centralized harvesting of these productive income 
sources became one of the causes for regional governments’ inability to fund their 
budgetary requirements. 
 
Governance with a financial system as illustrated has a tendency to rupture, even more so 
when the center’s use of funds is self-controlled and self-administered by each provincial 
office and district office. Although the allocation of funds that were channeled to the 
regions in the era prior to decentralization continued to increase, it was evident that the 
center was still controlling the funds by allocating the majority via the deconcentration 
mechanisms (as a means to soften the centralized system) rather than decentralization 
(World Bank 2003). As a result, these conditions further weakened the authority of regional 
governments. Consequently, besides being inclined to nurture the practice of corruption, 
collusion, and nepotism (KKN), a centralized financial system such as this also killed off 
any spirit of innovation and creation within regional governments and regional 
communities. This, among other reasons, was the cause of the monetary and political crises 
at the end of the 1990s that forced the New Order administration to step down. 
 
                                                
8The involvement of the center in the management of regional funds occurs not only for grants, but also for 
funds sourced from the region’s own income. This reality is shown by the statement of several governors that 
they still must ask for the center’s “blessing” to use funds from locally-derived revenues (PAD) (Usman et al. 
1996). This demonstrates the high level of centralization in the New Order era. 
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Table 2.1 gives a picture of the regional government income and expenditure before 
decentralization. Around 85% of the regional income was sourced from central financial 
transfers to the regions in the form of both subsidies and shared tax revenues. The regional 
government’s expenditure had been split into two groups: routine expenditure and 
development expenditure. Routine expenditure was used to pay civil servant wages as well as 
goods and services required to run the administration, while development expenditure was 
used to fund the development of new activities and projects in efforts toward regional progress. 
 
Table 2.1  Regional Government Income and Expenditure 
Details Total Income (% based on nominal figures) 
 1997/98 1998/99 
Previous year’s budget surplus  3.0 2.8 
Locally-derived revenue (PAD) 13.0 11.0 
Tax revenue 15.1 13.1 
SDO and Inpres Fund 68.0 71.9 
Other income 0.9 1.0 
 Total Expenditure (%) 
Routine expenditure 56.0 68.0 
Development expenditure  44.0 32.0 
Source: World Bank (2003) 
Note: SDO = regional autonomy subsidies; Inpres = Presidential Instruction 
 
Planning. At the policy level, mechanisms for the management of the Inpres Fund started 
with development planning from below in accordance with the Minister of Home Affairs 
Regulation No. 9/1982 on Guidelines for Preparing and Managing Development in the 
Regions (P5D). Plans for activities and projects to be funded by Inpres funds all fell under 
the development activities and projects funded by the APBD. 
 
The preparation of project plans was preceded by a community consultation meeting (musyawarah) 
on development at the village level, then further discussed at the subdistrict (kecamatan) level, and 
then adapted to fit the general planning framework prepared by all the government offices or 
agencies of autonomous regions. The outcomes from the offices or agencies were outlined in a 
development coordination meeting (rapat koordinasi pembangunan/rakorbang). A criticism that often 
arose from this process was that more and more outcomes of the musyawarah at the lower level were 
lost when the motions were proposed in the higher-level meeting. 
 
Allocation. Based on estimations of central allocation of Inpres funds, regional heads, 
through Bappeda and in conjunction with the relevant offices or agencies of autonomous 
regions, would fine-tune the program design in order to adapt the activities and projects 
requiring funding to the available allocation limit. At this level, it was often the case that 
several project suggestions that had already been agreed upon were not granted funding or 
were left off the list of activities and projects for the relevant year, but were instead added 
to the agenda for the following year’s development coordination meeting. 
 
Distribution and Flows. Inpres funds were distributed by the center via the publishing of 
Authorization for Development Assistance Budget (SPABP) which contained the funding 
allocations for regional governments. Funds were distributed through the National 
Treasury and Cash Office (KPKN) to regional cash accounts. From these accounts, Inpres 
funds were distributed to individual development activities and projects via the APBD. 
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2.2  DAK Regulation at the National Level  
 
Two legislative regulations on decentralization and regional autonomy, Law No. 32/2004 
and Law No. 33/2004, form the new basis for the application of political structure and 
governance administration, especially fiscal policy, in Indonesia. However, in practice, these 
regulations are often disrupted by legislative regulations concerning the tasks and function 
of ministries and nonministerial institutions that have not yet been brought into line with 
the new regulations on decentralization. These legislative regulations were formed under 
the centralistic system with a high level of authority to regulate and make various decisions 
in all corners of the country. As a result, while a large share of governmental authority has 
already been decentralized, the structure of ministries and nonministerial institutions has 
not really changed. On the budgeting side, they still control a relatively large share of the 
budget, including deconcentration and co-administration (dana pembantuan) funds for 
matters that have actually already been decentralized. 
 
Another obstacle to the implementation of decentralization is the late preparation of 
follow-on government regulations forming the basis for the creation and enforcement of 
relevant legislative regulations. In other words, the implementation of specific articles in 
laws is not supported by regulations that have been agreed to at the national level. An 
implication of this is that their implementation in the field can differ between ministries 
and also between regions. The late preparation of government regulations mandated by 
such legislation also occurred for laws in the previous era. For example, the directive of 
Law No. 5/1974 on Administrative Principles in the Regions to prepare a Government 
Regulation on the Implementation of Regional Autonomy Emphasizing District Regions 
was fulfilled 18 years after the law was approved (Usman et al. 1996). 
 
Law No. 32/2004 regulates that the authority for the coordination of a large share of 
administrative matters is to be delegated to the regions, while Law No. 33/2004 regulates 
fiscal balancing policy as a consequence of the division of authority between the central 
government and regional governments. The implementation of administrative matters that 
now fall under the authority of regional governments are funded from the APBD. 
Currently, a large number of regions are unable to collect any more than 15% of the total 
value of the APBD through locally-derived revenues (PAD). As a result, the central 
government must cover any shortfalls through balance funds consisting of DBH, DAU, 
and DAK which complement each other. Moreover, this observation is only focused on 
regulations that regulate the use of DAK. 
 
Article 162 of Law No. 32/2004 states that DAK is allocated in the APBN for specific 
regions in the framework of decentralization funding for (1) funding specific activities 
determined by the central government based on national priorities and (2) funding specific 
activities as suggested by the recipient region. A more thorough regulation of DAK is 
mandated in Article 162 Subsection 4, which states that DAK is to be regulated in a 
government regulation, but to date the intended regulation does not exist. Consequently, so 
far in practice DAK has only been allocated for the first purpose, while the second purpose 
has not been put into practice (Bappenas 2006). Bappenas gathered suggestions from the 
regions when DAK was first implemented. The value of the activities and projects 
proposed by the regions totaled in the hundreds of trillions of rupiah, far above the funds 
that the APBN can provide. One staff member from the Ministry of Education stated that 
he often receives letters of suggestion from the regions. However, they cannot all be 
considered for DAK allocation because the mechanisms are not yet in place. While not 
fully using the second approach, some regions have proposed to modify the use of DAK 
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that has already been allocated for specific sectors in their area for specific reasons, for 
example the improvement of education infrastructure in an area that has been hit by a 
natural disaster. Modifications such as these must be agreed to by the authorized official at 
the central level. 
 
Law No. 33/2004 regulates that the allocation of DAK is determined according to three 
criteria, which involve general criteria, specific criteria, and technical criteria.  
(i) General criteria are based on consideration of a regional government’s fiscal capacity, 
with priority given to regions whose discrepancy between general income and  civil 
servant expenditure is zero or negative or below the national average based on the 
net fiscal index. 
(ii) Specific criteria are prepared with attention given to legislative regulation, such as 
special regional autonomy and regional characteristics, for example coastal, island, or 
border regions. 
(iii) Technical criteria are based on considerations determined by technical departments 
or national ministries using indicators that illustrate infrastructural characteristics in 
each sector. 
 
Furthermore, Article 42 of Law No. 33/2004 orders the composition of a government 
regulation to especially regulate the management of DAK. However, to date the 
government has made no effort to issue such a regulation. Several cases have developed 
recently, such as the late ratification of the APBD and the holding of balance funds in the 
Bank Indonesia Certificate (SBI), which highlight the urgency for the immediate issue of 
a government regulation on the management of DAK. DAK cannot be distributed to 
regions before their APBD is ratified as it must be included in the APBD and the region 
is obliged to allocate co-funding (dana pendamping) to a minimum of 10% of the total 
DAK they receive. Holding funds as Bank Indonesia Certificates (SBI) impedes the 
APBD’s function as an activator of regional real sector economies (see Box 2.1). 
 
In addition, Article 108 of Law No. 33/2004 states that deconcentration and co-
administration funds forming a part of ministerial or state institution budgets used to 
implement matters that according to legislative regulations have become regional matters 
are to be transferred to DAK in stages. The law orders the central government to issue a 
government regulation to implement the transfer of these funds. Four years after the 
introduction of this legislation, there are no visible signs that the government will issue 
such a regulation. To date, not one district/city government official has paid attention to 
this issue. However, one provincial government staffer has conveyed their objection to 
regulations transferring deconcentration and co-administration funds to DAK, giving the 
reason that these balance funds are intended to help regional governments before they 
have sufficient fiscal capabilities, and hence balance funds, including DAK, should not be 
expected to keep growing; on the contrary, they should actually be reduced. The problem 
with that is that while various large sources of income are controlled by the central 
government, the majority of regional governments have not been able to obtain sufficient 
revenue to fund their activities. Several district staff consider that the provincial official’s 
objection is based on the fact that deconcentration and co-administration funds are 
managed by provincial governments, while DAK is managed by district/city governments. 
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Box 2.1  APBD Management: Information Obstacles and Sanctions 
 
Fostering economic growth is one of the important functions of the national budget (APBN)  and 
regional budgets (APBD). This function can be enabled if the government is able to efficiently and 
effectively manage the budget for real sector development. In connection with this, three large 
issues have recently arisen: (1) holding regional funds in Bank Indonesia Certificates (SBI); (2) 
issuing regional regulations on tax and retribusi (service fees) which are not reported to the Ministry 
of Finance; and (3) the late ratification of APBD. 
Bank Indonesia (BI) has reported that as of April 2007, regional government funds being held in the 
bank reached Rp90 trillion. “This is a very large total,” said the governor of BI (Kompas 2007). Earlier 
in the year, on the same topic, the Minister for Finance stated that his ministry would enact tighter 
control mechanisms for DAK flows so that regional budget funds channeled from the APBN can be 
put to maximum use in the real sector (Kompas 2007). 
Regional governments have not reported at least 1,366 regional regulations on regional tax and retribusi 
to the Ministry of Finance (Kompas 2007). There are rules requiring regional governments to submit 
their regional regulations to the central government; however, there are no penalties for failing to do so. 
Regional governments may intentionally fail to report their regulations to the center to avoid their 
invalidation by the central government. The regional regulations that are not reported are usually the 
sources of high fees or charges resulting in weakened competition in the business world. 
The head of Regional Autonomy Watch (KPPOD) has stated, “During the year 2006 many regions 
ratified their APBD in the middle of the year; in fact, some only ratified their budgets in the month of 
September. Clearly no development programs in the real sector can be done in that time frame” 
(Kompas 2007). Silalahi (2007) stated that if regions had not ratified their APBD by April 2007, it is 
certain that development activities would be delayed. A further consequence is that activities funded 
by the regional budget will be done in a hurry, with regional officials tending to procure goods and 
services by direct appointment, breaching Presidential Decree No. 80/2003. 
Many parties are demanding that clear sanctions be handed down to regions conducting actions 
such as those mentioned above. Both the executive and legislative officials suggested handing down 
sanctions such as the deferment of the distribution of balance funds. The Ministry of Finance had 
deferred the distribution of DAU for five districts that had been unable to finalize their APBD by 
11 May 2007 (Kompas 2007). Law No. 33/2004 indeed gives the Ministry of Finance the authority 
to postpone the distribution of balance funds to regions which do not submit regional fiscal 
information. 
It is well known that delays in the distribution of balance funds can impede economic activities. In other 
words, such sanctions are borne by the people through the disruption of economic activities; it is unjust 
when sanctions for official negligence in regional fiscal management flow down to all the people. The 
penalties for such negligence should be borne by officials and decision makers—
governors/bupati/mayors, the heads of regional government work units (SKPD), and members of 
regional legislature (DPRD). Hence, the formulation of sanctions for officials who are negligent in 
carrying out their duties must be considered, for example through salary cuts. 
Government Regulation No. 55/2005 on Balance Funds is the only government regulation 
that regulates DAK, as DAK is a part of balance funds. DAK is specifically directed to the 
development, procurement, increasing, and/or improvement of physical infrastructure for 
basic community services with a long economic time span. To state their commitment and 
responsibilities, the regions have the authority to allocate co-funding from their APBD 
reaching a minimum of 10% of the total DAK they received. The Minister for National 
Development Planning, together with the Technical Ministers, have conducted monitoring and 
evaluation on the use and technical implementation of several DAK-funded activities, while the 
Ministry of Finance has conducted monitoring and evaluation of its fiscal management. 
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DAK is allocated in the APBN according to the legislation on APBD and this allocation is 
in accordance with programs declared a national priority in the Presidential Decree on 
Government Work Plan (RKP) for the current year. Bappenas (2006) has made a 
comparison of the conformity of DAK-funded sectors with national development 
priorities based on the 2006 RKP. Table 2.2 shows that two sectors do not reflect the 2006 
RKP: the environment and regional governance infrastructure. The other sectors only 
conform with the RKP in terms of their titles; there is no conformity between sectoral 
activities and the activity aims within each national development priority, with the 
exception of the infrastructure sector in the framework of supporting the increase of 
employment opportunities, investment, and exports (Bappenas 2006). 
 
Starting in 2007, DAK sectors better conform to the development priorities and main 
activities set forth in the 2007 RKP (Table 2.3). For example, the Nine Years of 
Compulsory Basic Education program was included in RKP activities to rehabilitate school 
buildings at the primary level (57% are damaged) and junior secondary level (27% are 
damaged). In terms of education quality, the RKP stipulates activities for text book 
provision and the development of supporting facilities. On community health programs, 
among other efforts, the RKP formulated activities to increase the physical condition of 
puskesmas and the public health network, primarily in isolated, disadvantaged islands and 
border areas. On a different note, the RKP on road infrastructure as far as officially noted 
for roads and bridges rehabilitation/maintenance programs does not include activities that 
are appropriate for DAK funding. RKP generally contain activities covering stretches of 
national roads, while DAK is set aside for stretches of district/city roads (Bappenas 2006a). 
 
Table 2.2  Conformity of DAK Sectors with Development Priorities,  2006 
2006 Government Work Plan (RKP)  
Development Priorities 
2006 DAK Sectors 
1. Poverty and inequality reduction  
2. Increasing employment, investment, and 
export opportunities 
3. Revitalization of agriculture, fisheries, forestry, 
and rural areas 
4. Increasing education and health accessibility 
and quality 
5. Law enforcement, eradication of corruption, 
and bureaucracy reforms 
6. Strengthening defense capabilities, security 
and law and order stabilization, and conflict 
resolution 
7. Rehabilitation and reconstruction of Nanggroe 
Aceh Darussalam and Nias (North Sumatra)  
1. Education sector 
2. Health sector  
3. Public works sector  
• Road infrastructure 
• Irrigation infrastructure 
• Clean water infrastructure 
4. Regional governance infrastructure  
5. Maritime affairs and fisheries sector 
6. Agriculture sector 
7. The environment sector 
Source: Bappenas (2006) 
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Table 2.3  Conformity of DAK Sectors with Development Priorities, 2007 
2007 Government Work Plan (RKP)  
Development Priorities 
2007 DAK Sectors 
1. Increasing access of the community to 
education services of a higher quality 
2. Increasing access of the community to health 
services of a higher quality 
3. Acceleration infrastructure development 
4. Revitalization of decentralization and regional 
autonomy processes 
5. Revitalization of agriculture, fisheries, and 
forestry 
6. Improvement of natural resource 
management and environment conservation  
1. Education sector 
2. Health sector 
3. Public works sector 
• Road infrastructure 
• Irrigation infrastructure 
• Clean water infrastructure 
4. Regional governance infrastructure 
5. Maritime affairs and fisheries sector 
6. Agriculture sector 
7. The environment sector 
Source: Adapted from Bappenas (2006a) 
 
Apart from considering general and specific criteria, the Ministry of Finance’s calculation 
of DAK allocation considers technical criteria for specific activities upon the suggestion of 
the technical ministries. The specific activities are determined based on technical indexes 
for each sector after the relevant technical ministry coordinates with the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of National Development Planning. The 
following are the technical criteria for the three sectors that are samples in the study.9 
Technical criteria for the education sector consist of (1) the number of classrooms in poor 
condition, (2) the number of primary schools and equivalent schools, and (3) construction 
cost index. The technical criteria for the health sector are (1) community poverty index, (2) 
regional area, (3) population, (4) the number of puskesmas, secondary puskesmas, village 
maternity posts, mobile puskesmas, and health office posts, and (5) construction cost index. 
Technical criteria for the road infrastructure sector consist of (1) the length of the 
district/city road, (2) the length of the damaged stretch of road, (2) district/city road 
performance, and (4) construction cost index. 
 
The outcome of DAK allocation calculations are molded in the Minister for Finance 
Regulation (PMK) on DAK Allocations and Management Guidelines by Region. 
According to Government Regulation No. 55/2005, the Ministry of Finance must issue the 
PMK within 2 weeks from the ratification of the APBN legislation. Law No. 18/2006 on 
the 2007 APBN was ratified on 17 October 2006, while the PMK on DAK 2007 was only 
issued on 15 December 2006, or 2 months later. 
 
So far, DAK allocation is still quite low; up to 2005, its proportion of the total APBN 
expenditure was below 1% (Table 2.4). In an effort to increase the effectiveness of use of 
the limited funds, regional governments can form a DAK Activities Coordination Team, 
which coordinates the planning, implementation, reporting, and monitoring of DAK 
activities. This team is usually coordinated by a Bappeda official with members from each 
regional-level work unit to manage DAK. The coordination is intended to synchronize and 
create synergy for DAK’s use so that it does not overlap with the use of DAK for other 
development activities. The coordination is also intended to create transparency, 
participation, and accountability for each DAK-funded activity. 
 
 
 
                                                
9General observations of the three technical guidelines issued by each technical ministry are outlined at the 
end of this section. 
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Table 2.4  Developments in DAK Allocation, 2003–2007  
Details 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Number of sectors 4 5 6 7 7 
DAK in the APBN 
(million rupiah) 2,269,000 2,835,500 4,014,000 11,569,800 17,094,100 
DAK/TB as % of 
APBN  0.70 0.84 0.85 1.73   2.24 
Source: Adapted from APBN and Ministry of Finance Regulations for the respective years 
Note: TB = Total expenditure in the APBN; 2007 figures are still estimations. 
 
After receiving a DAK budget allocation document (SRAA), the regional head should 
arrange for a DAK utilization plan as set forth in the definitive plan (RD) and budget 
implementation statement (DIPA). The head of the relevant regional office of the DJP is 
consulted with concerning the three documents, and issues a DAK budget implementation 
statement authorization (SP-DIPA) once all three have been confirmed. On the basis of 
the DIPA, the regional head issues a budget implementation document (DPA)/DIPA for 
the regional level work unit containing budget activities and allocations for each sector that 
receives funding. Figure 2.1 explains the verification process for the definitive plan which 
then becomes a DIPA. 
 
Regional governments are required to follow technical guidelines issued by technical 
ministries in the management of DAK-funded activities. According to Government 
Regulation No. 55/2005, the technical ministry must determine the technical guidelines for 
the use of DAK at most 2 weeks after the Ministry of Finance determines DAK allocation. 
Below is a general picture of the three technical guidelines on the use of DAK in study 
samples (education, health, and road works). 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Note: Figure compiled from the results of interviews with relevant groups and several technical guidelines for the 
implementation of DAK. 
Figure 2.1  Mechanisms for Verifying Definitive Plans to Create Budget                           
Implementation Lists (DIPA)/Work Unit Budget Lists  
Directorate-General of 
Treasury issues a DAK 
Budget Allocation Document 
(SRAA) 
Technical Ministry issues 
technical guidelines 
National Treasury Regional Office 
issues the SRAA and technical 
guidelines as a tool to verify the 
technical office’s definitive plans 
(RD) and DIPA draft  
District offices arrange a 
definitive plan (RD) based 
on DAK technical 
guidelines and draft DIPA  
District offices use DIPA/DASK as 
a guideline to implement DAK 
budgets in each sector 
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Ministry of National Education Regulation No. 4/2007 on Technical Guidelines for DAK’s 
Implementation in the Education Sector Year 2007 was determined on 29 January 2007, or six 
weeks after the PMK on the 2007 DAK Allocation Determination was issued. Education 
sector DAK was allocated to support the implementation of the quality Nine Years of 
Compulsory Basic Education program. The activities were directed at (1) the rehabilitation of 
buildings/class rooms of primary schools and the equivalent—public, religious, state, or private 
schools, and (2) increasing the quality of basic education. 
 
The aims of DAK in the education sector are to realize transparent, professional, and 
accountable educational management, to actively involve the community, to push 
communities to become directly involved in the monitoring of educational activities, and to 
activate the economy in poor communities. The policy aims, among other things, to avoid 
overlapping with activities funded by the ministerial budget and the staged transfer of 
funding for activities that have become the regional matters from deconcentration and co-
administration funds to DAK. 
 
In the process of DAK utilization, the Office of Education and the Office of the Ministry 
of Religion, together with district/city education boards, form the technical team assigned 
to select recipient schools, socialize the activities, and monitor its implementation. Besides 
this, the school principal, assisted by the school committee or madrasa council, is 
responsible for implementing activities at the school level. The implementation of activities 
at the school level is self-managed involving the school’s local community.10 Funds are 
distributed to schools in entirety/in tact without deductions for tax from the regions to 
school bank accounts. Tax obligations are arranged by the school based on the valid 
regulations (see Appendix 7 for distribution, distribution mechanisms, and reporting of the 
use of DAK to the education sector). 
 
As a follow-up to these technical guidelines, on 15 February 2007, the Directorate-
General of Primary and Secondary Education issued Circular No. 643/C/KU/2007 on 
DAK Implementation Guidelines in the Education Sector for the 2007 Fiscal Year (FY). 
Then, on 16 February 2007, the director of Kindergarten and Primary School also issued 
Circular No. 0123/C2/LL/2007 on Technical Specifications for Furniture, Educational 
Aids, Reference/Enrichment Books for Libraries, Multimedia Equipment and Library 
Facilities, and Preparation of DAK Activities Reports in the Education Sector for the 
2007 Fiscal Year. 
 
The contents of both circulars are clear and detailed. If only regional DAK managers had 
carefully read them both, there would not be uniform measurements for student tables and 
chairs, only those appropriate for grade 1 students. If grade 3 and 4 students, let alone 
grade 5 and 6 students, use these chairs and tables, they would be forced to hunch. The 
physical consequences for these students after using such tables and chairs for years are 
easily imagined. Uniformity such as this is also found in the number of tables and chairs, 
which is set at 40 sets in each class, whereas many schools only have around 20 students 
per class; consequently, the surplus tables and chairs are simply stored in the back of the 
classroom.11 Other bungles involve the procurement of books to enrich student knowledge 
                                                
10Several groups, especially contractors, consider that this self-management of implemention activities 
contravenes Presidential Decree No. 80/2003 on Government Procurement Guidelines for Goods 
and Services. 
11Uniformity indeed lightens the duties of project managers, but looking for easy methods such as this is 
irresponsible because they do not consider the limited national fiscal condition. 
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for the school library. There are schools that buy 100 sets of one title, whereas it would be 
better to provided ten sets of ten different titles and therefore give students the 
opportunity to broaden their knowledge on a range of topics. 
 
Minister for Health Decree No. 7/Menkes/SK/I/2007 on Technical Guidelines for the 
Use of DAK in the 2007 Fiscal Year was issued on 8 January 2007, 3 weeks after the 
issuance of the PMK on the 2007 DAK Allocation Determination. Health sector DAK was 
allocated for efforts to increase access to and the quality of health services. These activities 
were aimed at upgrading, rehabilitating, expanding, supplying, and developing various kinds 
of health service units and the procurement of medical equipment to increase basic health 
services. 
 
The distribution of DAK allocation in the health sector to puskesmas and the health 
network is determined by district heads (bupati) and mayors at the suggestion of the 
district/city Health Office. The funds are not distributed on an even basis; rather, priority 
is given to the fulfillment of user needs. Each district is required to prioritize village health 
posts (poskesdes) to best support the Alert Village Program.12 Bupati/mayors appoint health 
sector regional government work units to oversee DAK-funded health activities. 
 
Each quarter (in March, June, September, and December), bupati/mayors must submit a 
report on activities, physical and fiscal realizations, and any problems to the secretary-
general of the Ministry of Finance. In March, districts/cities are also asked to send 
inventory data regarding all medical and health equipment in their region, including their 
condition, which will be used to gauge health sector DAK allocation for the following year 
(see the Appendix 10 for reporting mechanisms for the use of DAK). 
 
Minister for Public Works Regulation No. 39/PRT/M/2006 on Technical Guidelines for 
the Use of DAK in the Infrastructure Sector for Year 2007 was issued on 29 December 
2006. The Minister for Public Works adhered to Government Regulation No. 55/2005 by 
issuing the technical guidelines within 2 weeks after the PMK on the 2007 DAK Allocation 
Determination was issued. National priorities for DAK-funded road infrastructure 
activities are upgrading the integration of the road network, upgrading access to regions 
with economic potential (daerah potensial), opening up isolated and remote areas, and 
supporting the development of border areas. A minimum of 70% of the total road 
infrastructure DAK is allocated for periodic road maintenance (repairs to the body of the 
road and its foundations), and a maximum of 30% is set aside for upgrading roads. Routine 
maintenance and construction of new roads cannot be funded by DAK. Road 
infrastructure DAK is mainly allocated for periodic road maintenance and upgrading road 
and bridge infrastructure on stretches of road officially marked as district/city roads. 
 
The minister formed a coordination team and technical team at the ministry level to 
oversee the use of DAK, with the ministry providing special funding to cover their 
operational costs.13 At the provincial level, governors also form a coordinating team 
comprised of staff from Bappeda, relevant technical offices, and the central work unit in 
the region (Roads and Bridges Planning and Monitoring, P2JJ). Bupati/mayors also form a 
                                                
12Villages and resources that are prepared for, willing, and able to prevent and overcome health crises caused 
by both natural disaster or disease outbreaks (Supari 2006) 
13Not all departments provide operational funds for the coordination team at the department level. For this, 
DAK management staff in the Ministry of National Education, for example, have proposed that the central 
government provide DAK monitoring and evaluation funds. 
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coordinating team including Bappeda staff and other relevant offices to implement DAK-
funded activities at the district/city level. The head of the regional government work unit 
responsible for road matters is given the physical and financial responsibility for the 
implementation of DAK-funded activities. An article in the Minister of Public Works 
regulation above contains sanctions for the implementation of DAK activities which are 
not carried out in accordance with the regulation in the form of performance evaluations to 
be issued in the ministerial report to the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of National 
Development Planning, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the House of Representatives. 
In order to give such an evaluation, the minister requires reports on the implementation of 
DAK activities in each recipient region. Reporting is done at different levels by the 
regional-level work unit (SKPD) head, the regional head, and the minister.  With respect to 
this, Article 102 of Law No. 33/2004 gives the Ministry of Finance authority to hand out 
sanctions in the form of deferred distribution of balance funds, including DAK, to regions 
that fail to fulfill the reporting requirements. Each deferment of funds distribution to the 
regions has a negative effect on the economic activities of the local people. Hence, this 
article ensures that the general populace bears the burden of sanctions for the wrongdoings 
of officials (see also Box 2.1). 
 
 
2.3 DAK Regulations at the Regional-level 
 
It can be said that regional fiscal dependence on central government grants through 
balance funds has not changed even though decentralization and regional autonomy 
legislation has been reformed. As long as potentially large sources of national revenue are 
controlled by the central government, regional governments will continue to be dependent 
on the center. 
 
Although the amount of DAK is relatively small compared to the amount of DAU, most 
regions rely on DAK for expenditure capital (previously development expenditure), while a 
large proportion of DAU is used for civil servant and goods expenditure (previously 
routine expenditure). The regions usually manage DAK according to central government 
regulations; only several regions have issued regulations regarding the use of DAK adding 
to the details in the central regulations. Kabupaten Gorontalo is one of these regions, but 
the regulation is limited to the education sector. Each year, the bupati of Gorontalo issues 
Bupati Regulation on Technical Guidelines for the Implementation of DAK, which is 
aimed at regulating the self-management of DAK in the education sector regardless of the 
project value. The self-management of projects of an unlimited value breaches Presidential 
Decree No. 80/2003, which imposes a value limit of Rp50 million for self-managed 
projects.14 The bupati has not issued technical guidelines for other sectors as Gorontalo 
manages DAK in all the other sectors in full accordance with the same presidential decree, 
whereby activities with a value more than Rp50 million are subject to open tender. 
 
The Regional Government of Kabupaten Kupang gives the community wider 
opportunities to participate in the procurement of goods and services. Under the 
Community Empowerment Program (PPM), each year the district issues PPM 
implementation guidelines via a bupati decree. The PPM gives the community room to 
work on APBD-funded projects up to the value of Rp250 million in a self-managed 
manner without being subject to tender (Bupati of Kupang Decree No. 
                                                
14This bupati regulation is based on the Minister for National Education Regulation on Technical Guidelines 
for the Implementation of DAK. 
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134/SKEP/HK/2007). This decree therefore also fundamentally breaches the Rp50 
million project value limit stipulated in the presidential decree. 
 
As DAK is a part of the APBD, regional governments must manage it in conjunction with 
the legislative elements (DPRD) in addition to complying with central government 
regulations on DAK. Box 2.1 provides an illustration of problems associated with obstacles 
for the use of DAK. The region is not the only source of obstacles; in many ways, the 
regional decision-making process depends on various decisions made at the central level, 
causing delays at the regional end. 
 
At the district/city level, budget priorities and limits for each SKPD are determined by 
general APBD policies that must have been prepared in the July of the previous year 
(Article 35 of Government Regulation No. 58/2005). However, the 2007 APBN, for 
example, was only confirmed in October 2006, while DAK allocations were only 
determined in December 2006 before the Technical Ministry could adjust the allocation to 
come into line with the technical guidelines for the use of DAK. Time clashes in the 
issuance of several interrelated decrees have caused repeated stalling in the preparation of 
regional budgets (see Table 2.5). When the content of late-issued central decisions are 
different to regional estimations used in the formation of the APBD, many items in the 
budget plan must be reorganized or reevaluated and run past the DPRD again. Apart from 
wasting the time of regional officials, such a process wastes a significant amount of funds 
for regions with limited fiscal capacity. 
 
Table 2.5  Timetable of the Issuance of Regulations concerning the Management 
of DAK, 2007 
Regulation Issue Date Notes 
Law No. 18/2006 on the APBN for the 2007 Fiscal 
Year 17 October 2006 
Needed earlier as 
APBD preparation 
had started  
Minister for Finance Regulation No. 128/PMK.07/ 
2006 on the Determination of Allocations and 
General Management Guidelines for DAK in the 2007 
Fiscal Year  
15 December 2006 Six weeks late; 
should have been 
issued early 
November 
Minister for National Education Regulation No. 4/2007 
on Technical Guidelines for the Implementation of 
DAK in the Education Sector for the 2007 Fiscal Year 
29 January 2007 Four weeks late; 
should have been 
issued late December 
Minister for Health Decree No. 7/Menkes/SK/I/ 2007 
on Technical Guidelines for the Use of DAK for the 
2007 Fiscal Year  
8 January 2007 One week late, 
should have been 
issued late December 
Minister for Public Works Regulation No. 39/PRT/ 
M/2006 on Technical Guidelines for the Use of DAK 
in the Infrastructure Sector for the 2007 Fiscal Year 
29 December 2006 On time 
 
Generally speaking, regional governments are not in a position to suggest activities to 
be funded by DAK to the central government even though Article 162 of Law No. 
32/2004 makes it possible for regions to submit proposals. Regional governments only 
have the authority to submit and send data on the state of infrastructure and facilities in 
administrative sectors that obtain DAK allocation nationally. This data then becomes 
the basis upon which the central government (through the Ministry of Finance) 
allocates DAK to each region. Apart from using data from the regions, DAK allocation 
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calculations also use data sourced from Statistics Indonesia (BPS). Only after the 
regions are informed of their DAK allocation can regional governments plan its 
distribution to various activities in accordance with the central government stipulations. 
A criticism always emerged in focus group discussions (FGDs) regarding the weak 
database of data concerning various administrative sectors in the regions.15 This 
evaluation is usually based on the inappropriate selection of locations for DAK-funded 
activities. However, the assumption that the inappropriate selection of locations is 
solely caused by weak database is uncertain: for example, it may be caused by lobbying 
from specific interest groups. As another example, although DAK is not evenly 
distributed, several regions are forced to use an equality approach in order to avoid 
interregional social jealousies. When regional governments consider such an approach, 
the needs-based principle behind the concept of DAK tends to be ignored. 
                                                
15If this criticism is correct, the data sent to the center certainly should be questioned. 
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III. ALLOCATION OF THE SPECIFIC ALLOCATION 
FUND  
 
 
One of the aims of DAK allocation is to increase the supply of physical infrastructure and 
facilities that fall under national priorities and to increase economic growth to harmonize 
interregional growth as well as intersectoral services. Since 2006, seven administrative 
services sectors have received DAK: education, health, infrastructure (including roads, 
irrigation, and clean water), government infrastructure, agriculture, maritime affairs and 
fisheries, and the environment. Among those seven sectors, education, health, and road 
infrastructure always receive the greatest share of DAK. The total DAK allocation for 
these sectors reaches around three quarters of the total DAK. As explained in Chapter 2, 
DAK is a modification of the Inpres Fund of the New Order era. Differences include that 
the Inpres Fund used two approaches: sectoral and regional. Sectoral Inpres funds  
comprised Inpres funds  for primary schools, health, greening and reforestation, road 
upgrading, and markets. Regional Inpres funds comprised of provincial (Dati I) and 
district/city (Dati II) Inpres funds. Differing from the Inpres Fund, DAK is only allocated 
to districts and cities16 for specific sectors depending on national priorities as set forth in 
the RKP.  
 
At the beginning of fiscal decentralization, all DAK was sourced from reforestation funds 
(dana reboisasi or DR), totaling as much as 40% of the forestry sector revenue. Since 2003, in 
addition to using DAK to fund the development of the forestry sector, the government 
also uses DAK in other sectors to fulfill minimum service standards (SPM). In 2006, the 
government transferred the reforestation funds component of DAK to the Shared 
Revenue Fund (DBH) because it had similar characteristics to the “according to its origin” 
DBH concept and reforestation fund DAK.17 Initially, Non-reforestation fund DAK was 
only allocated to four sectors: education, health, infrastructure, and government 
infrastructure. But in 2004, the government added the maritime affairs and fisheries sector, 
and in 2005, the agriculture sector was added. Since 2006, DAK funding has covered a total 
of seven sectors with the addition of the environment sector. DAK-funded sectors are 
added in accordance with developments in the RKP and form a reference for the national 
development plan. 
 
In this setting, the development of the total nominal of DAK in the APBN depends on 
national fiscal capacity. During 2001–2007, the total nominal and the proportion of DAK 
to gross domestic product (GDP) have increased in line with the GDP. The determination 
of the total amount of DAK and its allocation to the regions is based on the decision made 
between the DPR Budget Committee and the central government, including the Ministry 
of Finance, Ministry of Home Affairs, Bappenas, and technical ministries within sectors 
receiving DAK allocations (Figure 3.1). 
 
While the mechanism for the determination of DAK involves several institutions, the final 
decision regarding the total amount of DAK and its allocation per sector and per region 
rests with the Minister for Finance after consultations with the DPR. The other institutions 
only have a facilitating role. The role of the technical ministries, for example, is to provide 
                                                
16Nevertheless, the understanding of DAK in Law No. 32/2004, Law No. 33/2004, and even Government 
Regulation No. 55/2005 does not explicitly state that DAK is only intended for district/city regions. 
17RI 2007 Financial Statement, Ministry of Finance 
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technical data for each region in their respective sectors. According to a respondent in the 
Ministry of Finance, technical data for various sectors is not up-to-date; this becomes a 
constraint for efforts to accurately and appropriately calculate the allocation of DAK to the 
regions. A number of respondents stated that one of the factors causing the lack of 
available comprehensive data is the lack of accommodation of the results of musrenbang at 
the village and district/city levels. 
 
 
 
      
     
     
    
     
     
     
    
     
     
 
 
  
     
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figure is compiled based on an analysis of several regulations 
related to DAK and interviews with relevant ministries. 
Figure 3.1  DAK Allocation Mechanisms at the Central Level 
Chapter II notes that regions must fulfill general, specific, and technical criteria in order to be 
eligible to receive DAK. According to several respondents, the process and formula used for 
calculating DAK are relatively complex (see Box 3.1). The details of the calculation process are 
not transparent and are difficult for the public to access. Many groups want the formula used 
for calculating DAK to be improved. In addition to reasons of transparency, an improved 
formula would be useful for the regions as they could apply it to estimate their DAK 
entitlements, hence easing the task of preparing their APBD.   
Central Government DPR 
APBN including the 
total amount of DAK 
Ministry of Finance & 
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DPR 
DAK allocation for each 
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3.1 DAK in the National Budget: Comparison of DAU, DAK, DBH, and 
Deconcentration and Co-administration Funds 
 
As the smallest component of balance funds, DAK makes a smaller contribution than DAU 
and DBH. Apart from this, the regulations regarding DAK are not as detailed as those 
regulating DAU and DBH. Under Law No. 33/2004, the share of DAU has been 
determined at a minimum of 26% of the net domestic income. The law also details the 
formula used for the distribution of DBH between the central government and regional 
governments. In contrast to the detailed regulation of DAU and DBH, the same law only 
states that the amount of DAK will be determined annually in the APBN. The absence of 
articles and also government regulations specifically regulating DAK makes it a flexible 
component of balance funds. While on the one hand, this flexibility can be used as an 
Box 3.1  Determination Process for DAK Allocation to Districts/Cities 
Step 1. The determination of which districts/cities can rightfully receive DAK is based on the 
net fiscal index (NFI) or the fiscal capacity of a specific region (NFI<1 automatically 
gives a region the right to DAK). This step is included in the general criteria. 
Step 2. Where a district/city does not fulfill the general criteria but fulfills one of the specific 
criteria as set forth in legislation such as special autonomy and disadvantaged areas, 
such as Aceh and Papua provinces (only Papua for 2007), the region is automatically 
entitled to receive DAK. 
Step 3. If the region is not in Aceh or Papua provinces, it must undergo the determination 
process based on the specific criteria as per step 2, which include coastal regions, 
regions bordering international neighbors, isolated regions, regions struck by floods 
or landslides, regions with food insecurity, and since 2007, tourist areas. These 
regional characteristics must be included on the regional characteristics index (IKW). 
Step 4. This step combines NFI (after being converted into having the same direction as 
IKW) and IKW to obtain a fiscal and regional index (IFW). 
Step 5. If a district or city’s IFW value is more than 1, the district/city is automatically 
entitled to receive DAK (although if based on the general criteria, it may not be). If 
the IFW value is less than 1, the region is not entitled to receive DAK. 
Step 6. Regions entitled to receive by this step include those that fulfill step 1 (NFI<1), step 2 
(districts/cities located in Aceh or Papua provinces even though they may have a 
NFI>1), or step 5 (IFW>1). 
Step 7. A regional weighting (BD) is calculated by multiplying the fiscal and regional index 
(IFW) by the construction price index (IKK). 
Step 8. For all districts/cities, the technical ministry calculates a technical index for each sector 
that will receive DAK. 
Step 9. A technical weighting (BT) is calculated by multiplying the technical index (BT) by the 
construction cost index (IKK). 
Step 10. A DAK weighting is calculated based on the results of the merging of the regional 
weighting (BD) and technical weighting (BT). 
Step 11. After the DAK weighting has been obtained, the Ministry of Finance determines the 
total amount of DAK that each district/city receives. 
Note:  This box was compiled based on the results of analysis of several regulations related to DAK and 
interviews with relevant ministries.  
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instrument for harmonizing interregional balance funds, on the other hand, it causes 
uncertainty for regional governments as to the amount of DAK funding they will receive. In 
addition, the inexistence of a rule that arranges the amounts, proportions, or percentages of 
DAK in APBN also generates an impression that DAK in APBN is merely a residual budget. 
 
Table 3.1 shows that DAK has experienced significant increases from year to year, both in 
terms of nominal value and in terms of its relative value against DAU and DBH. During 
2001–2007, its nominal value increased more than 24-fold, or 390% per year on average. 
When compared against the amount of DAU and DBH, DAK’s relative value also 
experienced a significant increase. Against DAU, DAK increased from 1.2% in 2001 to 
10.4% in 2007, whilst against DBH, it increased from 3.5% in 2001 to 25% in 2007. Apart 
from being caused by budget increases in each DAK-funded sector, the increase was a 
result of the expanding scope of DAK-funded sectors and an increase in the number of 
recipient districts/cities. In 2007, for example, there should have been 87 districts/cities 
that did not receive DAK; however, in a compromise between the central government and 
the DPR, all 87 regions ended up receiving it.18 
 
Despite the nominal increases from year to year, the total value of DAK is still very low 
when compared to the entire APBN. During 2001–2007, the highest percentage of DAK 
against the total APBN expenditure was 2.2% in 2007 and 2.4% of the total APBN 
revenue, also in 2007. 
 
Table 3.1 Comparison of DAK, DAU, DBH, Deconcentration and                               
Co-administration Funds, APBN, and GNP, 2001–2007 (billion rupiah)  
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
DAK 701 658 2,617 3,650 4,323 11,570 17,094 
DAU 60,345 69,114 76,978 82,130 88,765 145,664 164,787 
DBH 20,007 24,266 27,896 37,368 31,218 59,564 68,461 
D&C n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 9,906 30,046 n.a. 
TI 301,077 298,527 341,100 407,800 495,444 637,800 723,057 
TE 341,562 315,600 374,800 436,400 509,418 669,900 763,570 
DAK/TI (%) 0.23 0.22 0.77 0.90 0.87 1.81 2.36 
DAK/TE (%) 0.21 0.21 0.70 0.84 0.85 1.73 2.24 
DAK/GDP (%) 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.50 
DAU/TI (%) 20.04 23.15 22.57 20.14 17.92 22.84 22.79 
DAU/TE (%) 17.67 21.90 20.54 18.82 17.42 21.74 21.58 
DAU/GDP (%) 4.30 4.20 3.82 4.50 4.11 5.04 4.82 
DBH/TI (%) 6.65 8.13 8.18 9.16 6.30 9.34 9.47 
DBH/TE (%) 5.86 7.69 7.44 8.56 6.13 8.89 8.97 
DBH/GDP (%) 1.43 1.47 1.39 2.05 1.44 2.06 2.00 
D&C/TI (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.00 4.71 n.a. 
D&C/TE (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.94 4.49 n.a. 
D&C/GDP (%) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.46 1.04 n.a. 
Source: Data adapted from the SIKD (Regional Fiscal Information System) of the Ministry of Finance (2007) 
Note: D&C = Deconcentration and Co-administration funds; TI = total income (national revenue & grants); TE = total national 
expenditure; n.a. = data not available; using APBN realization figures for 2001–2006 and draft APBN figures for 2007 
                                                
18Based on an interview with a Ministry of National Education staffer. 
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Apart from the balance funds in the form of DAU, DBH, and DAK, the central government 
also currently allocates deconcentration and co-administration funds to the regions. Both 
deconcentration and co-administration funds come from the APBN, but they are not part of 
the balance funds. Deconcentration funds are sourced from ministerial/institutional funds 
handed out to governors as representatives of the central government in the regions. 
Technically, the allocation of these funds to the regions is handled by provincial government 
offices (dinas). As an example, in 2007, the Directorate-General of Primary and Secondary 
Education handled deconcentration funds to the value of Rp19.85 trillion, Rp16.379 trillion of 
which was transferred to provincial education offices for activities under the Nine Years of 
Compulsory Basic Education program. Co-administration funds are disbursed to regional 
governments or village administrations and are the direct responsibility of the central 
government. The combined total of deconcentration and co-administration funds is far greater 
than the total of DAK. In March 2006, for example, the total of these funds for all provinces 
reached Rp30.5 trillion, or around three times as much as the total DAK (see Appendix 1 and 
Appendix 2). This figure was a sharp increase from the previous year’s figure of only Rp9.9 
trillion: Rp4 trillion for deconcentration funds and Rp5.9 trillion for co-administration funds. 
 
In a link between these two fund sources and DAK, Article 108 of Law No. 33/2004 states 
that deconcentration and co-administration funds are to be transferred in stages to DAK. 
Following from this, it is estimated that the total amount of DAK is set to increase in the 
future. If it is assumed that the 2007 totals for deconcentration and co-administration funds will 
be the same as the 2006 totals, and that they will all be transferred to DAK, the total DAK 
figure for 2007 will grow to Rp47.1 trillion, or equivalent to 6.2% of the APBN expenditure. 
 
There are strong reasons for the transfer of deconcentration and co-administration funds to 
DAK as both funds share the same fundamental objective as DAK. All three funds are 
intended to fund various activities in administrative services that are now regional matters, but 
that are not yet sufficient, at least according to minimum service standards. The similar aims of 
the funds can be seen by the high correlation figures between the two. Table 3.2 shows that the 
allocation per province of the two groups of funds has a correlation of 0.7387, indicating that it 
is highly likely that similar parameters are used in the basic consideration of the allocations of 
DAK and the deconcentration and co-administration funds. 
 
Table 3.2  Correlation between Values of DAK and Deconcentration and Co-
administration Funds at the Provincial Level  
Variables Correlation Coefficient 
Total 2007 DAK as a proportion of total 2006 deconcentration & co-
administration funds  
0.7387 ** 
Per capita 2007 DAK 2007 by 2006 per capita deconcentration & co-
administration funds  
0.8364 ** 
Total 2005 DAK by 2004 provincial HDI  -0.2494  
Per capita 2005 DAK by 2004 provincial HDI  -0.2872  
Total 2006 deconcentration & co-administration funds by 2004 provincial HDI -0.0527  
Per capita 2006 deconcentration & co-administration funds by 2004 
provincial HDI 
-0.2872  
Total 2005 DAK as a proportion of 2006 DAK 0.8806 ** 
Total 2005 DAK as a proportion of 2007 DAK  0.9009 ** 
Total 2006 DAK as a proportion of 2007 DAK  0.9853 ** 
Note: ** significant at the level of 1%  
          HDI = Human Development Index 
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The correlation figures for both the per capita allocation of DAK and deconcentration and 
co-administration funds with the Human Development Index (HDI) for each province are 
low, –0.3364 and –0.3228 respectively. If HDI figures can be considered as a picture of, or 
to be as related to, the condition of public services in a particular region, the allocation 
policies for both types of funds go against the objective of ironing out interregional 
discrepancies in public service conditions; in other words, the allocation practices for both 
types of funds will not reduce the large gaps in public service provision between the 
regions.  Table 3.2 also shows the high correlation figures for the allocation of DAK from 
2005 to 2007, indicating that the policies and basis of consideration for DAK’s allocation 
do not change from year to year. 
 
 
3.2 DAK Allocation by Priority Sector  
 
Consistent with DAK’s flexibility, the central government appoints DAK recipient sectors 
in accordance with their priorities as set out in the government work plan for the particular 
year. Changes to development priorities as noted in the RKP will be reflected in changes to 
the sectors and activities to which DAK is channeled. To demonstrate, in 2007, the 
government placed a high priority on development in the education sector, and as a result, 
this sector received the greatest DAK allocation. In 2005 and 2006, in accordance with the 
development priorities for those years, infrastructure development received the largest 
share of DAK (Table 3.3). Furthermore, since 2005, the government has divided the 
infrastructure sector into three subsectors—road infrastructure, irrigation infrastructure, 
and clean water infrastructure—with road infrastructure receiving a greater allocation than 
the other subsectors. 
 
Table 3.3  Trends in National Nonreforestation DAK Allocation by Priority Sector, 
2003–2007 (million rupiah) 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2007) 
Based on RKPs, the seven sectors that receive DAK allocations have a direct impact on the 
attainment of national development priorities, which among others involve poverty and 
inequality reduction, an increase in employment opportunities, investment and exports 
support, an increase in the accessibility and quality of education and health facilities, and 
bureaucratic reform. In the future, depending on changes or additions to the national 
development priorities, it is possible that new sectors may receive DAK allocations. 
No.  Sector 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1  Education 625,000 652,600 1,221,000 2,919,525 5,195,290 
2  Health 375,000 456,180 629,000 2,406,795 3,381,270 
3  Infrastructure 1,181,000 1,196,250 1,533,000 3,811,380 5,034,340 
  3.1 Roads 0 839,050 945,000 2,575,705 3,113,060 
  3.2 Irrigation  0 357,200 384,500 627,675 858,910 
  3.3 Clean water  0 0 203,500 608,000 1,062,370 
4  Regional Government 
infrastructure 
88,000 228,000 148,000 448,675 539,060 
5  Maritime affairs and fisheries 0 305,470 322,000 775,675 1,100,360 
6  Agriculture 0 0 170,000 1,094,875 1,492,170 
7  The environment 0 0 0 112,875 351,610 
  Total DAK 2,269,000 2,838,500 4,014,000 11,569,800 17,094,100 
The SMERU Research Institute 26 
Over the span of 2003–2007, the highest increase of total DAK occurred during 2005–
2006 (188%), as a result of a significant increase in DAK allocations across all sectors 
(Table 3.4). Sectors giving the highest contribution to this increase, with individual 
increases of over 200%, are agriculture (544%), health (288%), and government 
infrastructure (203%). It is highly likely that the increase in the agriculture sector is linked 
to the central government’s current policy of revitalization of the sector. Over the period 
2006–2007, the environment sector received the greatest increase, at 216%. The increasing 
level of environmental destruction has resulted in various disasters such as flooding and 
landslides, evidently the primary reason for the increase in DAK allocation for that sector. 
 
Table 3.4  Increases in DAK Allocation by Sector, 2003–2007 (%) 
Source: Data adapted from the Ministry of Finance (2007) 
 
In the cases of the education, health, and infrastructure sectors, earlier in the report it is 
stated that these sectors have absorbed the dominant share of DAK funding. On the one 
side, this indicates that the government is placing a greater emphasis on the development 
of those three sectors; however, it also suggests that the physical infrastructure of these 
sectors is in such a poor state that the sectors require large amounts of funding before any 
improvements can be made. In line with DAK’s objective to reduce interregional service 
inequalities (by reducing interregional fiscal inequality), the worse the condition of service 
infrastructure in a region, the more DAK the region should receive. The reverse also 
follows; regions with a better state of service infrastructure should receive relatively smaller 
share of DAK. While this simple principle cannot entirely reveal the effectiveness of DAK 
allocation, at least it gives an initial indication of the efficiency of the DAK allocation for a 
particular region. 
 
To find out the accuracy of DAK allocation for a particular region, Table 3.5 presents 
calculation results of correlations between DAK allocations per province and the levels of 
indicators of physical infrastructure condition in the three sectors that this study focuses 
on. In the basic education sector, the indicator is the number of classrooms with heavy 
damage. The health sector uses the population ratio per puskesmas/secondary puskesmas, and 
the indicator for road infrastructure is the presence of roads that can be accessed by 
vehicles with four or more wheels. The results of the correlation calculations between per 
capita DAK allocations and the indicators in the basic education and road infrastructure 
indicate that the correlation value is in line with the DAK objectives, but not in the health 
sector. In the education sector, the correlation figure is positive, which means that the 
higher the number of damaged classrooms in a particular province, the higher the total 
No. Sector 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 
1  Education 4.42 87.10 139 78 
2  Health 21.65 37.88 288 40 
3  Infrastructure 1.29 28.15 149 32 
  3.1 Roads 0 12.62 173 21 
  3.2 Irrigation  0 7.64 63 37 
  3.3 Clean water  0 0 199 75 
4  Regional Government  
infrastructure 
159.09 -35.09 203 20 
5  Maritime affairs and fisheries 0 5.41 141 42 
6  Agriculture 0 0 544 36 
7  The environment 0 0 - 216 
   % of Total DAK 25.10 41.41 188 48 
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DAK allocation for the education sector in the relevant province. In the road infrastructure 
sector, the correlation figures are negative, indicating that the lower the ratio of roads 
accessible by vehicles with four or more wheels, the higher the DAK allocation is for this 
sector. Although generally DAK allocations for basic education and road infrastructure 
have been on target, Table 3.5 shows that the correlation is still quite low, at around 0.5. In 
the education sector, the correlation figure between both variables reaches as high as 
+0.4649. This means that the decision to allocate DAK in education sector to a region is 
based half on the number of classrooms with major damage and half on other factors. The 
same thing happens in the road infrastructure sector, which has the correlation value of 
-0.5122. This figure indicates that some consideration is given to factors other than the 
road conditions in the relevant regions. The correlation value in the health sector is -
0.6360. This figure means that the DAK allocation in the health sector is not based on the 
consideration of the number of population that has to be served by each puskesmas or 
secondary puskesmas. 
 
Table 3.5  Correlation of DAK Amounts with Indicators of the Condition of 
Education, Health, and Road Infrastructure at the Provincial Level  
Variables  Correlation Coefficient 
Per capita 2005 education DAK with total number of classrooms with 
minor damage 2005/06 
-0.4340  
* 
Per capita 2005 education DAK with total number of classrooms with 
major damage 2005/06 
0.4649  
** 
Per capita 2005 education DAK with total number of classrooms with 
minor and major damage in 2005/06 
0.0982  
 
Per capita 2005 health DAK with ratio of population per 
puskesmas/secondary puskesmas in 2005 
-0.6360  
** 
Per capita 2005 roads DAK with availability of road facilities accessible 
by vehicles with 4 or more wheels in 2005 
-0.5122  
** 
Total 2006 DAK with 2005 DAK  0.8806 ** 
Total 2007 DAK with 2005 DAK  0.9009 ** 
Total 2007 DAK with 2006 DAK  0.9853 ** 
Notes:   ** significant at 1% 
    * significant at 5%  
 
3.3 DAK Allocations in the Sample Districts/City  
 
The sample districts and city in this study have differing levels of socioeconomic 
development. In 2005, the per capita gross regional domestic product (GRDP) figure for 
Kota Banda Aceh, for example, reached Rp11.5 million, while the figure for Kabupaten 
Gorontalo was Rp1.8 million. The poverty levels in the four regions also show fairly 
significant differences. Data for 2004 shows that the poverty figures in Kota Banda Aceh 
and Kabupaten Wonogiri were 21.2% and 24.4% respectively, lower than the figures in 
Kabupaten Gorontalo and Kabupaten Kupang, which reached 33.5% and 32.7%. In line 
with these poverty figures, for the same year, the HDI19 for Kota Banda Aceh was the 
highest (74.7) and the lowest figure (62) was for Kabupaten Kupang. The KPPOD 
                                                
19The HDI is composed of life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, educational attainment, and real expenditure 
per capita. 
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evaluation (2005)20 of the four districts/city also shows differences in the character of their 
administrative institutions. Kabupaten Gorontalo received a value of A for aspects of local 
leadership and regional regulations, while in Wonogiri both aspects were only given a value 
of C (Table 3.6). 
 
Table 3.6  Summary of Several Economic, Poverty, and Institutional Indicators 
and DAK Allocations in the Four Sample Areas 
 Banda Aceh Wonogiri Gorontalo Kupang 
 GRDP/capita (2005-constant) 11,541,000 2,482,000 1,827,000 2,762,000 
 Poverty % (2004) 21.2 24.43 33.5 32.68 
 HDI (2005) 74.7 69.0 66.8 62.0 
 Institutionalism (KPPOD, 2005) n.a. C B B 
 (a) Law enforcement n.a. C B B 
 (b) Apparatus and services n.a. C B B 
 (c) Regional regulations n.a. C A B 
 (d) Local leadership n.a. C A C 
 2003 DAK (Rp million) 8,400 7,200 9,300 10,300 
 2004 DAK (Rp million) 11,432,26 9,350 13,070 9,240 
 2005 DAK (Rp million) 7,730 13,030 14,220 18,660 
 2006 DAK (Rp million) 22,630 32,410 31,830 33,070 
 2007 DAK (Rp million) 34,098 54,306 55,544 58,295 
 Largest recipient sector 2007 Education Education Infrastructure Education 
Sources:  BPS, UNDP, KPPOD, SIKD of Ministry of Finance (2007); adapted data 
Note: For the factor of institutionalism, Kabupaten Wonogiri’s figure was taken from the average value of districts in 
the former Surakarta Residency and the value for Kabupaten Kupang was taken from the average value for 
districts/cities in the West Timor region; n.a. = data not available  
 
Based on differing regional conditions such as those above, the size of DAK allocation for 
each sample region is also different. During 2003–2007, the total DAK received by Kota 
Banda Aceh, Kabupaten Wonogiri, Kabupaten Gorontalo, and Kabupaten Kupang 
respectively reached Rp84.3 billion, Rp116.3 billion, 124.0 billion, and Rp129.6 billion 
(Table 3.6). Reflecting the national increase in total DAK, DAK gains for the sample 
districts and city also experienced a significant increase. In 2003–2007, DAK gains for 
Kabupaten Wonogiri, Kabupaten Gorontalo, Kabupaten Kupang, and Kota Banda Aceh 
respectively increased by 164%, 124%, 116%, and 76%. With the exception of Kabupaten 
Wonogiri, the proportionate increases in the sample areas are still lower than the national 
increase in total DAK of 163% per year. 
 
For all sample regions, DAK has played an increasingly important role as a source of regional 
revenue from year to year, exceeding that of locally-derived revenues (PAD). In 2003, the 
average total of DAK for the four sample districts and city had reached 66% of their total PAD 
allocation. In 2006, the figure increased to 212%, meaning that the growth in DAK allocation 
far exceeded the growth of PAD. These conditions gave DAK an increasingly important role 
in the APBD. In 2003, the average contribution of DAK to the APBD of the sample districts 
and city was 3.2%, but by 2006, it had increased to 7.2% (Table 3.7). 
 
                                                
20Due to security problems, the KPPOD did not conduct the survey in Kota Banda Aceh or other districts in 
NAD Province. 
The SMERU Research Institute 29 
Table 3.7  DAK as a Percentage of Income and Expenditure for Sample 
Districts/City (2003–2006) (%) 
 Wonogiri Kupang Banda Aceh Gorontalo 
Total APBD Revenue     
2003 1.78  4.19  3.60  3.16  
2004 2.23  3.53  4.95  5.92  
2005 3.15  6.77  3.25  5.92  
2006 5.23  8.85  6.13  8.57  
Average 3.10  5.84  4.48  5.89  
Locally-derived Revenue (PAD)     
2003 28  50  134  51  
2004 37  40  121  108  
2005 37   128   150   73   
2006 96   253   250   248   
Average 50   118   164   120   
Total Balance Funds     
2003 2.15   4.84   4.71   3.71   
2004 2.63   3.95   5.81   6.71   
2005 3.56   7.54   3.68   6.82   
2006 5.67   9.24   6.77   9.00   
Average 3.50   6.39   5.24   6.56   
Capital Expenditure     
2003 8.11   28.31   23.93   11.95   
2004 13.32   46.41   37.64   28.95   
2005 18.80   68.04   22.46   38.05   
2006 25.11   38.69   25.85   61.30   
Average 16.33   45.36   27.47   35.06   
Source: APBD documents of the sample districts/city, 2003–2006 
 
Apart from its role in supporting regional income, DAK plays an important role in 
increasing the capital expenditure capacity of regional governments, which tends to 
continually increase from year to year (Table 3.7). In 2003, DAK’s average contribution to 
the capital expenditure capacity of the sample districts/city was 18.1%. The figure 
continued to increase in the following years and in 2006, the figure had reached 36.8%. In 
2006, in Kabupaten Gorontalo, it even reached 61.3%. This development illustrates how 
regional development has become ever more dependent on DAK. If this tendency 
continues, there is the possibility that the substance of regional autonomy, which provides 
regions with the independence to form development policies appropriate for regional needs 
and priorities, will be lost. 
 
The use of a large share of the DAK allocated to the sample districts and city follows the 
national priorities for DAK: the education, health, and road infrastructure sectors. During 
2005–2007, the total proportions for DAK in all sample districts/city for the three sectors 
were 68.5%, 71.3%, and 71.8% in the respective years (Table 3.8). Nevertheless, several 
differences appear when it is looked at from the priorities in the different districts/city. 
Kabupaten Kupang and Kabupaten Gorontalo had increases in their allocation to DAK 
for the three sectors, from 50.1% and 64.1% respectively in 2005 to 66.5% and 73.6% in 
2007. In Kota Banda Aceh, however, the proportion of DAK for the sectors fell from 
88.5% in 2005 to 76.3% in 2007, and in Kabupaten Wonogiri, the figures were relatively 
stable at around 72% (Table 3.8). The decline in the proportion of DAK used in the three 
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sectors in Kota Banda Aceh does not indicate that the city shifted its priorities for the use 
of DAK; rather, the city received a significant amount of additional DAK for the 
agriculture sector, thereby reducing the total proportion for the other sectors. In 2005, 
Kota Banda Aceh was not allocated the DAK for the agricultural sector, but in 2006 and 
2007 respectively, the sector was allocated Rp2.54 billion and Rp3.03 billion (Appendix 3). 
 
Table 3.8  Percentages of DAK Allocation by Sector in Sample Districts/City, 
2005–2007 (%) 
Sector Banda Aceh Wonogiri Gorontalo Kupang 
Education     
       2005 41.4    33.8    29.5    22.6    
       2006 31.2    31.9    22.8    25.2    
       2007 37.6    37.2    26.0    27.4    
Health     
       2005 20.2    15.3    16.0    11.7    
       2006 21.1    20.3    21.4    21.7    
       2007 18.5    19.6    18.9    20.7    
Road Infrastructure     
      2005 26.9    22.3    18.6    15.8    
      2006 22.3    19.7    26.8    20.9    
      2007 20.2    14.4    28.7    18.4    
Other Sectors     
      2005 11.5    28.5    35.9    50.0    
      2006 25.4    28.1    29.0    32.2    
      2007 23.8    28.8    26.4    33.6    
Source: SIKD of Ministry of Finance (2007); processed 
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IV. USE OF THE SPECIFIC ALLOCATION FUND: 
TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND 
PARTICIPATION 
 
 
In the efforts to balance finances between the centre and the regions, while DAK really 
only acts as an additional type of balance funds, it has become increasingly important to the 
regions for their development. As DAU, the main component of balance funds, is generally 
only enough to fulfill the needs for bureaucratic expenditure, the use of DAK in the 
regions has become a key factor supporting regional development in particular and national 
development in general. 
 
Apart from DAK, deconcentration and co-administration funds are also sources of funding 
for development projects in specific districts and cities. However, in contrast to DAK, 
these funds are not part of the balance funds and therefore they do not form part of the 
district/city APBD; provincial governments have the authority to manage the funds’ use. 
On the one hand,  for district/city governments, DAK is more transparent and offers more 
certainty for development funding than deconcentration and co-administration funds, due 
in part to the criteria that the central government developed for the allocation of DAK to 
the regions. On the other hand, open selection criteria are not used in fund allocation for 
projects that use deconcentration and co-administration funds, meaning that regional 
governments cannot estimate the possibility that they will receive these funds. Whether or 
not a region will receive these funds is highly dependent on the policies of the technical 
ministry that holds the funds. 
 
As part of the APBD, DAK falls under the authority of regional governments. 
Nevertheless, giving the reason that regional governments are to use DAK in accordance 
with national priorities, the central government regulated the use of DAK in several 
regulations, such as the technical guidelines issued in several regulations from the minister 
for finance and technical ministries. Since decentralization and regional autonomy in 2001, 
the number of DAK-funded sectors has risen. While initially DAK was limited to funding 
reforestation, over the following years, the government widened DAK’s scope to other 
sectors21 in accordance with the national priorities as stated in the RKP. As it has 
previously been noted, as of 2007, seven sectors of governance services are covered. 
 
Based on the background, scope, and definition of DAK as stated in the introductory 
chapter, the government’s decision to increase the scope of DAK-funded sectors has been 
interpreted in various ways, including those that follow.  
(i) The DAU and DBH formulas have failed to fulfill their function as the main 
components of the balance funds. It has often come to the attention of regional 
government circles that the sense of the word “khusus” (specific) that has stuck to 
DAK will be increasingly lost as more sectors receive DAK funding. 
(ii) Regional government development performance in at least the seven DAK-funded 
sectors is still low. This forces the central government to become involved with the 
development of those sectors. The sample districts and city generally stated that 
their “powerlessness” in the development of the DAK-funded sectors is not 
because they do not care; rather, it is due to nothing other than funding constraints. 
                                                
21Reforestation funds were transferred from DAK to DBH in 2003. 
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The fact that the majority of the balance funds in the form of DAU and DBH is 
only sufficient for fulfilling routine bureaucratic expenses, as previously stated, 
means that only a limited amount of funding remains for development. 
(iii) The central government’s priorities have expanded. When viewed from the aspect 
of development in general, their role in developing the various sectors is positive. 
Nevertheless, when viewed from the perspective of decentralization and regional 
autonomy, the government’s growing intervention in regional government affairs 
has negative implications. Efforts to place regional governments as important 
entities in regional development have become blurred. The broadened scope of 
activities and the increase in the total DAK for regions are accompanied by the 
limitation of “what is allowed and what is not allowed”; this limits the authority of 
regional governments. Conversely, central government authority is becoming 
stronger. If the number of sectors that use DAK mechanisms for their 
development continues to increase, intentionally or not, centralization politics will 
slowly take over from decentralization policy. Therefore, the various regional 
government circles are not entirely wrong to claim that any remaining regional 
autonomy only exists in the words of legislation. In practice, the extent of regional 
government authority is narrowing. Furthermore, the following section analyzes 
regional government practices in the use of DAK in the three sectors that this 
study focuses on: health, education, and road infrastructure. 
 
 
4.1 Development Planning and Examination of DAK  
 
4.1.1 Development Planning 
 
In 2004, the government ratified Law No. 25/2004 on National Development Planning 
Systems. To implement this legislation, on 20 January 2005 Bappenas and the Ministry of 
Home Affairs issued Joint Circular No. 0259/M.PPN/I/2005.050/166/SJ on Technical 
Guidelines on the Organization of Development Planning Community Consultative 
Meetings (musrenbang). Normatively, the existence of this law as well as the rules for its 
implementation reconfirms the need for a more participative development planning 
process. The musrenbang model is not in fact a new mechanism as regional governments 
have been using it since the time of the New Order administration. 
 
In all sample regions, with the exception of Kota Banda Aceh, regional governments hold a 
musrenbang each year and it has become the sole mechanism for capturing community 
aspirations in the process of development planning preparation. Every year, the musrenbang 
series usually starts in January (at the village level) and ends around April or May (at the 
district level). In Kota Banda Aceh, musrenbang are only held once in 5 years when the city 
government is preparing its strategic plan. The community no longer participates in the 
spelling out of the strategic plans in annual work plans or the APBD with the reason that 
community aspirations are accommodated in the strategic plan. According to a Bappeda 
Kota Banda Aceh staff, the process of drafting the APBD and/or implementing annual 
development plans is technical and accordingly, the community does not need to be 
involved. 
 
The musrenbang conducted in preparation for district/city development planning are basically a 
form for gathering community suggestions. In district-level musrenbang, Bappeda then merges the 
suggestions with sectoral planning for each SKPD. The result of this amalgamation becomes the 
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district or city’s development planning document. During this stage, regional governments start 
to map out possible sources of funding for the various activities, that is, via DAU, PAD, DAK, 
or deconcentration and co-administration funds. The document is then taken to the provincial-
level musrenbang. The provincial development planning document resulting from the provincial 
musrenbang is then used as the provincial government’s reference for the national musrenbang. 
 
Although the musrenbang model has been used since the New Order administration, some 
groups in the regions—mainly nongovernment groups—still question its effectiveness in 
the birth of a participatory development planning process. They consider that the 
musrenbang process is more inclined to put forward  representative mechanisms that do not 
truly reflect community aspirations with a significant risk of elite capture. It is actually quite 
possible that suggestions are put forward in the name of community interests, whereas they 
actually represent the interests of elite groups. 
 
The analysis above shows that the receipt of DAK in a particular region is not linked to the 
regional development planning process, particularly musrenbang. In this context, regional 
governments really only have a passive role in the allocation of DAK. It is therefore 
understandable if regional government circles state their dissatisfaction with the entire 
DAK allocation process. 
 
The results of FGDs in four districts/city all reflect the dissatisfaction of the aforementioned 
regional government official. On the aspect of DAK management planning, FGD participants 
placed the planning stage at the sixth (lowest) ranking compared to other stages of the DAK 
management process (Table 4.1 and Appendix 5). 
 
Table 4.1 FGD Participants’ Satisfaction Rankings for the Different Stages of 
DAK Management in Sample Districts/City 
Component 
Stage Transparency Accountability Participation 
Overall 
Ranking  
Planning 6 6 6 6 
Determination of Project 
Allocation 3 3 3 3 
Funds disbursement 2 1 1 1 
Implementation 1 2 2 2 
Monitoring and Evaluation 4 4 5 4 
Coordination 5 5 4 5 
Source: FGDs in the four sample districts/city 
Note: 1 = The highest satisfaction; 6 = Dissatisfied/the lowest satisfaction 
 
The FGD participants’ rather low evaluations of the planning aspect of DAK were 
generally based on the following reasons. 
(i) The database on the condition of infrastructure in the regions was not up-to-date, 
particularly in the health and education sectors. 
(ii) The discussion of the results of village- and subdistrict-level musrenbang at the 
SKPD level is closed. 
(iii) The regional government does not have a significant role in the planning of the use 
of DAK as its use has been limited by central government stipulations. 
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In contrast to what the other sample districts’ FGD participants saw, FGD participants in 
Kabupaten Gorontalo saw the development planning process in general, not only with 
regard to the DAK planning. They considered that the musrenbang process right up to the 
preparation of the development planning document reflects a participatory, accountable, 
and transparent mechanism. The district government has also made an effort to explain to 
various communities that their suggestions are not yet accommodated in development 
planning. Based on this evaluation, FGD participants gave the development planning 
process in Kabupaten Gorontalo a fairly high evaluation. 
 
4.1.2 Problems Surrounding the Allocation of DAK to Regions  
 
There is actually no direct relationship between the development planning practices in 
districts/cities and the pattern of the central government's determination of DAK. There 
are several reasons for this. Firstly, district/city development plans that also encompass 
planned funding sources from DAK will come to rest at the provincial level. Secondly, the 
provincial-level development planning document taken to the national musrenbang is a 
synthesis of district/city development planning, not a compilation of the plans of each 
respective district/city. Thirdly, the central government uses its own guidelines (based on 
the three criteria previously mentioned) when allocating DAK to the districts/cities. 
 
It is interesting to note that although the central government possesses the criteria and 
basic formula for the allocation of DAK to the regions, some regional government officials 
are of the opinion that there is room to lobby the central government. In other words,  
regional governments can influence the central government in matters of DAK allocation 
to specific regions. In Kabupaten Kupang and Kabupaten Gorontalo, for example, several 
respondents claimed that the bupati played “a big role” in the increase in DAK funding to 
their districts, which suggests that strong lobbying from a bupati can influence additions to 
the DAK allocation for regions. Apart from “direct intervention” from the bupati, several 
respondents also stated that their respective SKPD took their activities plan straight to 
Jakarta to obtain DAK. They referred to this step as “escorting the proposal to the center”. 
 
Central government officials offer different explanations for the above phenomenon. In 
one group, a respondent in a technical ministry stated that their ministry indeed summons 
the relevant SKPD, both at the district/city and provincial levels, every year for the 
purpose of obtaining explanations regarding the relevant office's entire development plan. 
Keeping in mind that such meetings are usually held before DAK allocations are 
determined, the impression that emerges is that central government and regional 
government officials come to some form of an “agreement”. In another group, a central 
government official respondent in fact admitted that regional governments lobby to obtain 
DAK. According to the respondent, this occurs due to the lack of transparency 
surrounding the management of DAK. The determination of allocations is inclined to be 
bias to the point where the possibility of “dagang sapi” (cow-trading), or bargaining between 
shady central government and regional government officials by lobbying the technical 
ministries or Ministry of Finance, has emerged. The emergence of the term “duta daerah di 
Jakarta” (regional ambassador in Jakarta) is perhaps a direct indication of the 
aforementioned deal making. On another aspect, DPR members fighting to represent the 
interests of their electorates also intensify the DAK “percaloan” (brokering). As an example 
of the lack of transparency, Kota Banda Aceh received far more DAK (Rp3.027 billion) for 
the agriculture sector than for the maritime affairs and fisheries sector, whereas the city's 
agricultural potential is smaller than its maritime and fisheries potential (see Ministry of 
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Finance Regulation No. 128/PMK.07/2006). Such peculiarities add to the proof of how 
difficult it is to coordinate technical ministries even though there is a coordinating minister. 
 
Aside from this phenomenon, some regional government officials also stated that there is 
not really a direct relationship between district/city development planning and the 
allocation of DAK funds, which is the sole responsibility of the central government based 
on the specific criteria. In addition, the role of the SKPD is only to provide data to the 
relevant technical ministry. As such, if a particular district/city SKPD goes to Jakarta 
before the DAK allocation has been determined, it is only doing so to distribute data to the 
relevant ministry. Regional governments only have a passive role in DAK allocation. In 
fact, one respondent in Kabupaten Kupang stated, “While regional governments do not 
take any measures, the central government will still give DAK to the region.” Thus far, the 
Kabupaten Kupang Health Office, for example, has not taken any special measures to 
make a DAK planning strategy or proposal to fund their activities plan. The allocation of 
funds and its sources depends on Kabupaten Kupang's government policies. 
 
An examination of Law No. 32/2004 and Law No. 33/2004 seems to confirm the various 
perceptions on DAK that emerged from regional government circles as noted above. 
Under Law No. 32/2004, DAK allocation demands a bottom-up approach based on 
regional government proposals. According to respondents from the Ministry of Finance 
and Bappenas, at the beginning of the regional autonomy, the central government had tried 
to apply bottom-up mechanisms. However, as the proposals from the regions tended to be 
irrational in terms of the exorbitant total cost of the proposals,22 the central government 
did not continue with that approach. Instead, they chose the top-down approach reflected 
in Law No. 33/2004, under which the division of DAK fundamentally follows top-down 
mechanisms. 
 
Normatively, although the allocation of DAK uses a top-down approach, the process uses 
objective mechanisms. The technical ministries, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Home 
Affairs, Bappenas, and the DPR all have intensive roles in DAK's allocation in accordance 
with their respective functions. However, in practice, according to a Bappenas respondent, 
the allocation of DAK is the domain of the Ministry of Finance and the relevant technical 
departments, while the Ministry of Home Affairs and Bappenas are not actively involved. 
The respondent also suggested that a particular consequence of this process for regional 
governments is that they do not know how much DAK that they will be receiving when 
they are preparing the APBD, complicating the budget preparation process in the regions. 
 
Another respondent from a technical ministry offered a different explanation. Since 
decentralization, their ministry had not been involved in the determination of DAK 
allocation. According to the respondent, the technical ministry's role is no more than 
providing requested technical data to the Ministry of Finance; the Ministry of Finance 
together with Bappenas fully determine DAK allocation for both individual sectors and 
regions. 
 
Information regarding DAK allocation practices becomes even more blurred when the 
response of a Ministry of Finance respondent is added to the mix. He stated that the DAK 
allocation determination is truly the product of input from various groups in accordance 
with their respective authorities. According to this respondent, to determine the total 
                                                
22The value of the combined DAK proposals in the regions reached figures in the hundreds of trillions of 
rupiah. 
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budget in each sector, the Ministry of Finance obtains input from Bappenas and technical 
departments so that the outcome is in accordance with the RKP. The draft allocation 
determination is then reviewed by the DPR Budget Committee. After the DPR agrees to 
the total DAK and its allocation, the Ministry of Finance coordinates with the technical 
department and keeps Bappenas and the Ministry of Home Affairs informed. Then, in 
accordance with Government Regulation No. 55/2005, the final decision for the sectoral 
determination as well as the determination of DAK for each region falls under the 
authority of the Ministry of Finance. 
 
The above analysis indicates that in practice, there is no consensus surrounding DAK 
allocation mechanisms within either central or regional governments. Such circumstances 
allow for differing perceptions on both the constraints of discourse and  the “lobbying 
efforts” to receive DAK, which itself requires a fair amount of funds. If it is indeed true that 
lobbying efforts can influence DAK gains, perhaps it can still be understood from the cost 
benefit aspect. However, if in fact the DAK allocation process truly follows the prevailing 
game rules and hence cannot be influenced by lobbying from regions, those efforts are 
merely the arena of deception of people who claim they are able to influence DAK gains. 
The intense issue of “percaloan anggaran” (“budget brokering”) in the past is the phenomena 
behind the chaotic allocation practices for DAK and the other types of balance funds. 
 
In the regions, the issue of budget brokering is not only noted in the discourse, but rather, 
it has become a matter of fact. One nongovernment organization (NGO) respondent in 
Kota Banda Aceh, for example, pointed out a copy of an official document from 
Kabupaten X (signed by the bupati) which contained details of “cooperation” between 
Kabupaten X and company Y based in Jakarta. The document stated that Kabupaten X 
had assigned PT. Y in Jakarta to take care of DAK allocation for maritime affairs and 
fisheries. When the assignment was achieved, PT. Y would be compensated in the form of 
a fee of 10% of the total DAK that Kabupaten X received. 
 
 
4.2 Determination of Allocations and Project Types  
 
Several central government officials stated that while the central government has the 
authority to determine DAK allocations, regional governments still have some freedom to 
use the funds in accordance with their autonomy. In the education sector, for example, 
regional governments have full authority to determine which schools will receive DAK 
allocations. Nevertheless, this does not mean that regional governments can use DAK 
entirely as they wish as they must follow the technical guidelines stipulated by the center 
(see Section 2.2). For example, as also previously noted in Chapter 2, the Ministry of Public 
Works has determined that in FY 2006, a minimum of 70% of the total DAK for road 
infrastructure may be used for periodic road maintenance and a maximum of 30% is to be 
used for road upgrading. The Ministry of Education has also outlined that in 2007, 60% of 
DAK must be used for the restoration of primary-level school buildings and the remaining 
40% should be used to upgrade education quality. 
 
4.2.1 Determination of Project Location 
 
Each sample district and city stated that they use a participatory approach within the 
musrenbang forum to determine the location of DAK-funded projects based on a scale of 
priorities. Not all development activities proposed by the community can be realized. Apart 
from the obvious funding limitations, several regional government officials stated that this 
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is because community suggestions are often not appropriate for the overall regional 
development framework. However, whatever the reason, the emerging impression is that 
the musrenbang process is not an effective mechanism for participatory development 
planning. 
 
In practice, regional governments decide on DAK project locations according to SKPD 
plans rather than proposals from the community. Within certain limits, nepotism and 
personal ties between government bureaucrats and project recipients, such as school 
principals or puskesmas heads, can sway project determinations. Consequently, it is not 
unusual for the process to become polemic within the community. In Kabupaten 
Wonogiri, for example, in 2006 the DPRD conducted an audit and they came across five 
primary schools that should not have received DAK; the schools had used the funds to 
build new classrooms, not to rehabilitate existing buildings. In 2007, even more plans for 
primary school restoration are not appropriate. The DPRD decided to cancel 29 of the 88 
restoration plans submitted by the Education Office as they did not fulfill the conditions 
and instead the projects were relocated to other primary schools. According to one DPRD 
member, the determination of recipient primary schools can be inappropriate partly due to 
the existence of personal ties between school groups (principals or school committees) and 
bureaucrats in the subdistrict or district/city branches of the Education Office. 
 
Possibly related to the problem of personal ties, one primary school that received DAK in 
Kota Banda Aceh in 2006 was bold enough to exceed the DAK spending limit by almost 
double to renovate and build several classrooms. To cover the shortfall in funds, the school 
committee obtained credit from a building materials supplier. The school committee was 
convinced that they would obtain DAK again in 2007 in order to pay off their debt. 
 
Kabupaten Gorontalo and Kabupaten Kupang also experienced problems surrounding the 
determination of DAK project locations. One NGO active in the education sector in 
Kabupaten Gorontalo stated that among all the management aspects of DAK, project 
location determination is the most troubled by collusion. As an example, one primary 
school had submitted a proposal for building restoration for five years running, but they 
had not yet obtained DAK. On the other hand, one school had received DAK in two 
successive years. Apart from that, one school received DAK assistance as well as 
deconcentration funds assistance. One NGO in Kupang also expressed that the 
determination of DAK project locations was a site of collusion. In this case,23 one school 
had definitively obtained a DAK allocation based on a bupati decree; however, that decision 
was overturned by another bupati decree. According to one respondent, this occurred 
because one party had tried to persuade the school principle to employ a specific 
contractor to carry out the project. However, because the school principle did not agree, 
the school’s DAK allocation was transferred to another school. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the DAK project location determination process is not 
completely objective or transparent, FGD participants gave it a relatively good evaluation, 
ranking the participation in the process in the third position compared to the other stages 
(see Table 4.1 and Appendix 5). This evaluation is perhaps more of an indication of the 
greater role that the SKPD plays in project allocation determination rather than an a 
reflection of the participants’ satisfaction regarding the role that the community plays via 
the musrenbang process. 
 
                                                
23This case ocurred in Kabupaten Timor Tengah Selatan  or South Central Timor District (not a sample area). 
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4.2.2 Problems Surrounding the Technical Guidelines 
 
Sample district/city governments stated that the uniformity and rigidity of the technical 
guidelines to the point that conditions in specific regions are ignored are among the main 
problems surrounding the use of DAK. As a consequence, the regions cannot use DAK to 
maximum efficiency in accordance with their interests; in fact, counterproductive 
conditions can emerge. The strict technical guidelines accompanying the DAK allocation 
are an indication that the central government does not really aspire to full regional 
autonomy. To comment on views such as this, central government circles generally stated 
that the strict regulation on the use of DAK is one of the central government’s controls 
over regional governments, apart from being based on theory and legality. If regional 
governments had full discretion over the use of DAK, the central government would be 
afraid that many regions would spend DAK on bureaucratic interests as it has happened 
with DAU. 
 
Aside from the different opinions concerning the DAK technical guidelines, the following 
section provides several regional government problems in putting the technical guidelines 
into effect. 
 
(i) Technical guidelines that are inappropriate for regional conditions 
 
Sectorally, technical guidelines are often inappropriate for regional conditions. In 
Kabupaten Kupang, for instance, the majority of road surfaces are still earth or have not 
been asphalted. However, the technical guidelines direct that 70% of the DAK for road 
infrastructure must be used for maintenance and only 30% may be used to upgrade road 
conditions. This certainly is not fitting for the requirements in Kabupaten Kupang, which 
is more in need of funds for road upgrading activities. In Kota Banda Aceh, a different 
issue arises. DAK allocation in the education sector may only be used to fund the 
restoration of existing primary school buildings, whereas almost all primary school 
buildings in the city that were destroyed as a result of the tsunami have been rebuilt by the 
Rehabilitation and Construction Body (BRR) and other various domestic and international 
aid institutions. As a result, DAK is being used to renovate primary school buildings that 
are still technically in good condition. 
 
Another problem uncovered is the determination of standard cost units. In 2006, the 
central government determined a standard package of Rp150 million to restore three 
classrooms, whereas the level of damage in each school is different; some schools may only 
require one classroom to be repaired whilst another may have six classrooms with major 
damage. In this context, regional governments suggested that the primary school building 
restoration funding packages as far as possible be adapted to reflect the needs of each 
school. While schools that only require one classroom to be renovated do not require 
sufficient funding for three classrooms, schools with six classrooms in need of renovation 
do need to be given a sufficient level of funding to renovate all of those classrooms. Under 
the current system, if a school is given the standard package for three classrooms, it is 
difficult for them to obtain another package in the following year even if they still have 
classrooms in need of repair. Apart from that, the uniform package amount of Rp50 
million per classroom does not reflect the true conditions in the field; in Kabupaten 
Kupang alone, there are three zones for the construction materials price index. 
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Uniformity in the technical guidelines for the procurement of supplementary equipment 
to increase education quality as well as medical equipment also causes the ineffective use 
of DAK funds. One example of this has already been detailed in Section 2.2, regarding 
the procurement of classroom furniture. Several more cases illustrating this point are 
noted below. 
 
 Typewriter procurement  
 
As part of the package to improve education quality, the central government requires 
all schools (cases from Kabupaten Wonogiri and Kabupaten Gorontalo) to receive a 
package of Rp1.55 million for a typewriter. According to one respondent in the region, 
the central government has stipulated that the typewriter must have the letter beta (β). 
In both Kabupaten Wonogiri and Kabupaten Gorontalo, the typewriter fulfilling those 
requirements is the “Royal–Special School Edition”. Several respondents questioned 
the effectiveness of using a typewriter for school administration. Schools in urban 
regions are more in need of a computer than a typewriter. In one primary school in 
Kabupaten Wonogiri, the typewriter is only stored in the corner (Appendix 12). The 
teachers have never used it as the school has a computer. 
 
 Book procurement 
 
The package for supporting books that schools receive does not reflect school needs. 
One primary school in Kabupaten Wonogiri with only 92 students has 200 copies of 
one book title. In connection with this, the school committee questioned why the 
Education Office entrusted the school to carry out school building improvements 
while the task of procuring supporting materials for education quality had been given 
to a third party. 
 
 Vaccine refrigerator procurement  
 
A similar story is found in the health sector. For the procurement of vaccine 
refrigerators, for instance, according to the technical guidelines, a puskesmas must buy a 
refrigerator with certain specifications priced up to Rp30 million per unit, whereas 
according to the puskesmas doctor, vaccines can be stored in an ordinary refrigerator 
costing far less. Ironically, the specifications for the rehabilitation of puskesmas buildings 
do not include the provision of electricity installations or medical waste disposal 
facilities. 
 
(ii) Staged funds disbursement  
 
The staged DAK funds disbursement process is not appropriate for the conditions in 
several regions. In the case of Kota Banda Aceh, the majority of offices or technical 
agencies using the DAK budget had not submitted requests that the funds be paid in stages 
according to project progress; instead, they generally only submit the payment request once 
the project or activity has been completed. This is usually the case as contractors do not 
submit invoices according to the project’s progress. To date, a large share of contractors 
choose to finish the job or project entirely before submitting their invoice. According to 
several respondents within the Kota Banda Aceh government, contractors choose this 
approach to avoid the administrative bureaucracy of repeated funds disbursements. 
Commenting on this issue, one FGD participant stated, “Contractors do not want to 
disburse funds a number of times as each disbursement requires a fee.” 
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In Kabupaten Kupang and Kabupaten Gorontalo, which cover wide regions, regional 
government officials also highlighted the staged funds disbursement mechanism as an 
inefficient policy, mainly for isolated regions with poor road infrastructure. Such conditions 
frequently cause delays in administrative procedures which culminate the late completion 
of projects. For the self-managed construction of primary school buildings, as an example, 
each funds disbursement process requires signatures from the school committee, the 
subdistrict public works officer, and the education office branch head. If one of these 
people does not sign the invoice, for instance, because they are not available, the 
disbursement process is held up. Although several respondents criticized the DAK 
disbursement mechanisms, FGD participants actually rated it the highest of all other 
aspects of the DAK management (see Table 4.1 and Appendix 5). 
 
(iii) Delays in the issue of the technical guidelines  
 
All the sample regional governments protested the central government’s delays in issuing the 
technical guidelines for DAK utilization, which resulted in at least two issues: Firstly, regional 
governments cannot immediately begin DAK-funded development activities, and secondly, 
there is the possibility that planned development activities to be funded by DAK and already 
allocated in the APBD are not in accordance with the technical guidelines. If the second issue 
arises, regional governments are forced to submit a request for exception to the relevant 
technical ministry or readjust their APBD. A readjustment can waste a significant amount of 
funds and time as the executive must prepare the revisions and then reconsult them with the 
DPRD. Under such conditions, regional governments are inclined to conduct the 
adjustments when they are working on the Revised APBD (APBD-P) usually in August. As a 
consequence, the implementation time for DAK-funded projects is diminished and this 
affects the quality of the activities. 
 
 
4.3 Project Implementation  
 
In all the sample regions, DAK-funded construction projects are usually either self-
managed (swakelola) or put out to tender. In the education sector, the Ministry of National 
Education has stipulated that all primary school rehabilitation projects are to be self-
managed. The principal and/or the school committee are the program implementers. The 
self-management system is the same as direct appointment. One respondent in the Ministry 
of National Education suggested that the self-manage construction system is part of the 
philosophy of the national education management, that is, that education is the 
responsibility of the government and the community. By adopting this approach, the 
ministry hopes that the community can contribute to the development of the physical 
education infrastructure. Contrasting that policy, the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of 
Public Works have stipulated that DAK projects are to adopt the tender process. In the 
sample districts and city, both the self-managed and tender systems are working well for 
construction activities. Visually, the construction quality in primary schools, puskesmas, and 
roads seems to be good. Hence, FGD participants rated the implementation of DAK 
projects as second after funds disbursement (see Table 4.1 and Appendix 5). 
 
Notes on the implementation of self-managed projects (proyek swakelola) 
  
From one perspective, the self-managed system has been able to reduce the cost of primary 
school building restoration, allowing the project implementers to increase the volume of 
work. In one primary school receiving the Presidential Instruction (Inpres) Fund in 
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Kabupaten Kupang, DAK funds to the value of Rp108 million that should have only 
funded the restoration of three classrooms were enough to fund repairs for five rooms: 
three classrooms, one library, and one teachers’ office. If using market prices as a measure, 
the value of the work reaches Rp400 million, or 270% of the total value of the DAK 
budget. In line with this, a staff at the Kabupaten Wonogiri Education Office stated that 
based on empirical experience, the self-managed system has several benefits, such as better 
building quality, a greater volume of work being completed, economic empowerment 
translating into an increase in local community income, as well as the empowerment of 
school committees. 
 
Another positive outcome from the self-managed system stems from the significant 
contributions from students’ parents, both in the form of labor and contribution of 
building materials. In Kabupaten Kupang, all workers only ask for a wage of Rp15,000 per 
day, lower than the normal rate which can reach Rp25,000–Rp35,000 per day. This is also 
the case with the procurement of building materials. For example, the market price of teak 
can reach Rp3.2 million per cubic meter, while students’ parents may sell it to the school 
building committee for Rp1.5 million per cubic meter. 
 
It is not really a problem when the government asks the community to contribute to 
education sector building projects. However, for regions where the majority of the 
population is poor, such as Kabupaten Kupang and Kabupaten Wonogiri, such requests 
are inappropriate. One NGO in Kupang stated that requesting poor communities to 
contribute to education development is ironic. The government should not use the 
philosophy of education responsibility as a cover-up for their failure to build education 
infrastructure. From the point of view of poor communities, it is their government that 
should help them, not the reverse. In this context, the system of self-managed has failed to 
reach its objective of economically empowering local communities. 
 
Another criticism of the self-managed system comes from contractors. They stated that the 
self-managed method of project works is fundamentally in a breach of Presidential Decree No. 
80/2003 on the Government Implementation Guidelines for the Procurement of Goods and 
Services as well as Law No. 18/1999 on Construction Services. For example, technically, the 
quality of self-managed projects is in doubt because the implementers do not possess a 
certificate of competency as required under Law No. 18/1999. If undesired outcomes arise, 
such as the building collapsing as a result of construction error, no-one can be held responsible. 
Another criticism is that the self-managed system opens up the high possibility of collusion. 
This is because not many tradespeople have the appropriate skills to implement building works 
for public facilities, and hence, principals or school committees award the job to a third party, 
either an individual or a contractor. One contractor in Kabupaten Kupang stated that in the 
past, in order to obtain a project, the contractor had to follow the regional government’s tender 
process, while now they only need to go to the principal or the school committee. 
 
 
4.4 Monitoring and Evaluation of DAK Projects 
 
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities for development projects are still highly 
inadequate. Especially for DAK projects, among the problems is that both the central 
government and regional governments do not allocate any budget for M&E activities. 
FGD participants gave this aspect a relatively low evaluation, as the fourth out of the six 
aspects of DAK management (see Table 4.1). In Kabupaten Kupang and Kabupaten 
Wonogiri, FGD participants gave it the lowest rating (Appendix 5). 
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FGD participants in Kota Banda Aceh gave M&E activities a fairly high rating. One reason for 
this is that the Kota Banda Aceh Government has formed the DAK Implementation Monitoring 
and Evaluation Team, consisting of elements from Bappeda, the Finance Division, and the 
Development Division. The team is assigned to directly monitor DAK project implementation. 
In addition, as part of the city government internal auditing function, the Kota Banda Aceh 
Regional Supervision Board (Baswada) also routinely inspects DAK projects. FGD participants 
were of the opinion that the intensity of M&E activities in the city was quite high as the city is an 
urban area and so the team can easily visit project locations. While that is the case, Kota Banda 
Aceh Bappeda stated that M&E activities are still not optimal. The main problem lies with the 
very low operational funding. In 2006, the city’s APBD only provided around Rp8 million for 
M&E activities for DAK projects, while in 2007, no funds at all have been provided. 
 
As a consequence of the lack of provision for a special M&E funding component for DAK 
projects, M&E activities in the other three sample districts have only been administrative 
and passive. Each district office tends to wait for reports from the project coordinators or 
implementers, and rarely visit project locations. If in fact they do visit a project, it is usually 
an incidental visit made in the context of a different activity. 
 
The weak and superficial nature of M&E activities for DAK projects may well be connected 
to the absence of any form of follow-up on such activities. Staff from DAK recipient offices 
stated that they had not received any feedback from their report to the technical ministry. 
The Kabupaten Kupang Health Office, for example, routinely sends activities progress report 
to the Ministry of Finance every three months. However, the region has never received any 
response or feedback from the central government. As a result, the region is unsure of 
whether or not their reports have actually reached their intended recipient. 
 
According to the legislation, as outlined in Government Regulation No. 55/2005 and 
various technical guidelines from technical ministries, each region must submit quarterly 
progress reports for their DAK activities to the central government and the regional 
representative of the central government in the region (provincial governor). In 2006, the 
national number of regions that submitted reports that were received by technical 
ministries was extremely low, at less than half of all the regions (see Table 4.2). In the 
agriculture sector, the figure was as low as 10%. This shows the level of regional 
compliance with legislative demands as well as the technical ministries’ lack of commitment 
to monitoring and evaluating the regions’ use of DAK. One explanation from a technical 
ministry on these conditions was the absence of M&E funds. 
Table 4.2  Percentages of District/City Governments that fulfill their DAK 
Reporting Requirements 
No. Sector % 
1  Roads 45% 
2  Irrigation 45% 
3  Clean water 45% 
4  The environment 65% 
5  Agriculture < 10% 
6  Maritime affairs and fisheries 45–60% 
7  Education < 50% 
8  Health n.a. 
Source: Bappenas (2006) 
Note: n.a. = data not available 
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A startlingly low level of DAK reporting was also found in the four sample provinces. In 2005, 
out of 77 districts/cities, not one had submitted a status report for activities in the road 
infrastructure subsector. The stipulations currently in effect set out sanctions for neglecting to 
submit reports, but they have not been enforced. If the sanctions were to be implemented, they 
have been evaluated as being unjust for the populace. Each deferment in funds disbursement 
leads to delays in the people receiving any benefit, whereas it is the bureaucrats who have failed 
to do as required (see also Box 2.1). 
Table 4.3  Numbers of Districts/Cities in Sample Provinces that have Submitted  
a Report for Road Infrastructure, 2005 
Number of Districts/Cities 
No. Province 
DAK recipients Those that have submitted 
reports 
1 NAD 21 0 
2 Central Java 35 0 
3 NTT 16 0 
4 Gorontalo 5 0 
 TOTAL 77 (434) 0 (195) 
Source: Bappenas (2006) 
Note: National figures in parentheses 
 
4.5 Coordination 
 
Coordination is one of the weak points in the management of DAK. This can be seen 
from the low evaluations it was given by FGD participants, at the fifth of the six phases of 
DAK management. In Kota Banda Aceh, for example, Bappeda admitted that they are not 
directly involved in the initial planning stage for DAK-funded programs and activities. 
Each SKPD using DAK funds devises its own plans and only submits their activities plan 
to the mayor via the Development Division. After the mayor has signed off on the plans, 
Bappeda receives the reports. Bappeda, as the leading actor in the executive budget 
committee, then incorporates the plans into the APBD. This process shows that Bappeda 
really only has an administrative role in DAK utilization. As such, interagency 
coordination of DAK budget users is not evident. This lack of coordination results in the 
ineffective and off-target use of DAK funds. One member of the Kota Banda Aceh 
DPRD gave the example of a primary school that was recently rehabilitated using the 
DAK fund and was subsequently torn down because they received a larger amount of 
funding from a donor/NGO to build the school. 
 
In another sample district, Bappeda consistently stated that all the SKPD always 
coordinate with Bappeda both before and after they receive their allocation of DAK 
funds. Nevertheless, the FGD participants generally said that the aspect of coordination, 
both inter-SKPD coordination and coordination with agencies at the provincial level, is 
weak. Generally, respondents stated that each SKPD is inclined to put forward their own 
tasks and functions without wanting to see the tasks and functions of other related SKPD. 
This is in part because each SKPD has to adhere to technical guidelines, so in practice, 
there is no room to make adjustments according to the joint needs in the region. 
 
Particularly relevant to the weak coordination between district/city governments and 
provincial governments is the case of a primary school that received both DAK and 
deconcentration funds at the same time. In this case, the district government generally 
blames the provincial government because they determine project locations “as they 
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please”, without first coordinating with the district government. In Kabupaten Kupang, 
for example, in 2007, the regional government had selected primary school X as a DAK 
recipient. However, the provincial government also selected the same school as a recipient 
of deconcentration funds. One NGO in Kabupaten Gorontalo reported a similar case, 
where a school received deconcentration funds after already receiving DAK. The staff 
from Kabupaten Gorontalo Education Office responded that this case occurred because 
the DAK fund was insufficient to repair all the damage to the particular primary school. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
The APBN allocates DAK to fund specific public services provided by district/city 
governments. The aim is to reduce inequalities in public services between the regions. 
Although DAK forms part of the APBD, regional governments must conform to various 
central regulations for its use. In addition, DAK, which is developed for the purpose of 
assisting regional finance, to some extent has altered to becoming an obstacle in the 
regional budgeting process. 
 
The research on the various regulations found four points with the potential to impede the 
DAK management. 
(i) As yet, there is no government regulation that specifically regulates DAK24 (such as a 
government regulation on DAK as mandated by Law No. 32/2004 Article 162 (4) 
and Law No. 33/2004 Article 42) and the government regulation on the transfer of 
deconcentration and co-administration funds to DAK (as mandated by Law No. 
33/2004 Article 108). 
(ii) The timetable for the central government’s release of allocation decisions and 
issuance of DAK regulations conflicts with that for APBD preparation. 
Consequently, apart from regional governments having to make adjustments to their 
budgets, the project implementation time becomes limited. 
(iii) Several policies are in dire need of national uniformity but should still allow for 
variation on some aspects. Conversely, other policies that do not currently allow for 
any flexibility lead to the ineffective use of funds, and as such require revision in 
order to provide room for regional, local, or other specific variations, while still 
retaining some level of national uniformity.  
(iv) Various laws on organizations and ministerial/institutional tasks with centralistic 
nuances have not yet been adapted to decentralization law. As a result, DAK 
management policies are different both between ministries and between regions. The 
absence of syncronization between DAK, deconcentration, and co-administration 
funds has made the use of the funds not optimum.  
 
These four obstacles lead us to the conclusion that various regulations must be reformed in 
order to support the proper implementation of decentralization and regional autonomy in 
general and DAK management specifically, thereby optimalizing efforts to balance the 
quality and quantity of public services throughout Indonesia. 
 
In theory, regulation provides room for regional governments to actively submit proposals 
for the use of DAK. However, in practice, they have become passive recipients, when 
actually, they heavily rely on DAK for their regional capital expenditure. To date, regional 
governments are only asked to send data on the condition of regional infrastructure in 
various sectors, which the central government uses to determine DAK allocations. The 
attitudes of regional governments to the central government’s handling of DAK allocation 
indicate a view that the central government is not transparent, to the point where regional 
officials need to “lobby Jakarta” to obtain a larger DAK allocation. A quantitative analysis 
of DAK allocation by province indeed shows a low correlation with poor public service 
                                                
24Government regulations that regulate DAK are bundled with government regulations broadly dealing with 
balance funds. DAK is one component of balance funds. 
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infrastructure conditions in the basic education and road infrastructure sectors, and in the 
health sector, the correlation sign even has an opposite direction with the objectives of 
DAK. 
 
It is evident that coordination and communication surrounding DAK management 
between agencies at the central level and the regional level, including both provincial and 
district/city levels, are still limited. In addition, there are still few regional governments that 
fulfill their obligations to report developments in the use of DAK every 3 months, as 
mandated by legislation. There are four reasons for this:  
(i) while the regulations provide sanctions for not reporting, the central government has 
not applied the sanctions; 
(ii) several regional governments that have submitted reports have not received any 
response from the central government, and consequently, the regional governments 
are no longer concerned about their reporting obligations; 
(iii) the sanctions for failing to report would be applied to the region, not the negligent 
official, and correspondingly, officials do not feel obliged to compile the report; 
and/or 
(iv) regional governments do not have sufficient capacity to manage public finances. 
 
Based on the various findings above, it can be generalized that the management of DAK is 
centralistic, while the central government does not have the capacity to monitor its use in 
more than 400 districts and cities. As such, SMERU recommend the following measures. 
 
(i) The central government should build a number of new paradigms in the management 
of DAK by decentralizing it to the provincial governments. This would authorize 
provincial governments to implement DAK allocation, coordinate DAK management, 
and monitor district/city government use of DAK. This authority should be equipped 
with safeguarding regulations to guarantee the implementation of transparency and 
participation mechanisms, accountability procedures, and a reward and punishment 
system. Such a policy would have three benefits: 
 the simplification of DAK management at the central level; 
 the strengthening of governors’ authority as representatives of the central 
government in the regions; and 
 the empowerment of provinces as autonomous regions through fiscal 
discretion.25 
 
(ii) Sanctions for failing to submit regional fiscal management reports, including those 
required for DAK, as set out in Law No. 33/2004 Article 102, should not be borne by 
the region or populace as a whole. Instead, the penalty should be imposed upon 
bureaucrats, who must share the responsibility for their negligence amongst themselves. 
 
                                                
25If part of the deconcentration and co-administration funds are transferred to DAK, as is mandated by law, 
the proportion of DAK to total APBD expenditure can reach around 4%, while in 2006 alone the proportion 
of DAU to APBD expenditure reached 22%. 
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Appendix 1.  Recapitulation of Total Allocations of Deconcentration and 
Co-administration Funds based on Budget Work Plans for 
Ministerial and Nonministerial Offices (RKL-KL) FY 2006 
(million rupiah) 
 
 
Source: SIKD of Ministry of Finance (2006) 
Note: Data are preliminary figures sourced from Budget Work Plans for Ministerial and Nonministerial Offices (RKL-KL) for 
March 2006. 
 
No. Agency Deconcentration Co-administration Total 
1 Home Affairs 106,824 244,970 351,794 
2 Agriculture 1,104,028 1,931,964 3,035,992 
3 Industry 72,094 0 72,094 
4 Energy and Mineral Resources 150,244 0 150,244 
5 National Education 17,719,711 0 17,719,711 
6 Health 2,703,504 1,841,073 4,544,577 
7 Religion 45,445 0 45,445 
8 Labor and Transmigration 473,832 563,943 1,037,775 
9 Social Affairs 966,406 0 966,406 
10 Forestry  136,636 0 136,636 
11 Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 646,031 258,496 904,527 
12 Public Works 87,261 437,034 524,295 
13 National Ministry of the Environment 2,300 0 2,300 
14 State Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs 210,000 0 210,000 
15 Indonesian National Library 9,625 3,500 13,125 
16 Coordinating Agency for Investment 5,000 0 5,000 
17 Indonesian National Archives  3,650 0 3,650 
18 Trade 76,315 0 76,315 
19 National Ministry for the Youth and Sport 112,000 0 112,000 
20 Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Body  113,361 21,019 134,380 
  Total 24,744,267 5,301,999 30,046,266 
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Appendix 2.  Recapitulation of Total Allocations of Deconcentration and 
Co-administration Funds by Province, based on Budget Work 
Plans for Ministerial and Nonministerial Offices (RKL-KL) FY 
2006 (million rupiah) 
No. Province Deconcentration Co-administration Total 
1 NAD (Aceh) 987,052 190,485 1,177,537 
2 North Sumatra  1,477,193 216,043 1,693,236 
3 West Sumatra  632,351 128,165 760,516 
4 Riau 567,083 115,255 682,338 
5 Riau Islands 204,111 32,255 236,366 
6 Jambi 443,771 121,649 565,420 
7 South Sumatra  760,094 194,421 954,515 
8 Bangka Belitung 263,286 52,577 315,863 
9 Bengkulu 370,330 138,769 509,099 
10 Lampung 980,842 107,351 1,088,193 
11 Jakarta  638,321 10,732 649,053 
12 West Java 2,707,889 232,042 2,939,931 
13 Banten 815,305 85,110 900,415 
14 East Java  2,374,032 384,830 2,758,862 
15 Yogyakarta 439,188 68,419 507,607 
16 East Java  2,669,019 408,626 3,077,645 
17 West Kalimantan  652,125 180,133 832,258 
18 Central Kalimantan  446,108 186,462 632,570 
19 South Kalimantan  453,749 163,741 617,490 
20 East Kalimantan  475,791 227,477 703,268 
21 North Sulawesi  436,291 114,116 550,407 
22 Gorontalo 237,718 85,664 323,382 
23 Central Sulawesi  500,749 155,084 655,833 
24 South Sulawesi  890,926 312,362 1,203,288 
25 West Sulawesi  172,390 92,960 265,350 
26 Southeast Sulawesi  390,648 219,548 610,196 
27 Bali 455,985 82,157 538,142 
28 West Nusa Tenggara  659,903 185,378 845,281 
29 East Nusa Tenggara  773,674 250,868 1,024,542 
30 Maluku 628,103 153,969 782,072 
31 North Maluku  479,150 175,708 654,858 
32 Papua 540,367 121,788 662,155 
33 West Irian Jaya  221,120 107,855 328,975 
 Total 24,744,667 5,301,999 30,046,666 
Source: SIKD of Ministry of Finance (2006) 
Note: Data are preliminary figures sourced from RKA-KL for March 2006.  
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Appendix 3.  DAK Allocation by Sector in Kota Banda Aceh and 
Kabupaten Wonogiri, 2005–2007 (million rupiah) 
 
Sector Kota Banda Aceh Kabupaten Wonogiri 
  2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
 Education 3,200 7,050 12,804 4,410 10,340 20,205 
 Health 1,560 4,780 6,293 2,000 6,580 10,660 
 Infrastructure 2,080 6,270 9,070 4,930 10,090 14,594 
 (a) Roads 2,080 5,050 6,873 2,910 6,380 7,798 
 (b) Irrigation 0 0 0 1,360 2,200 4,140 
 (c) Clean water 0 1,220 2,197 660 1,510 2,656 
 Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries 
890 1,690 2,176 900 1,700 2,489 
 Agriculture 0 2,540 3,027 790 3,400 5,598 
 Regional Government 
infrastructure 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
 The Environment 0 300 728 n.a. 300 760 
Source: SIKD of Ministry of Finance (2007) 
Note: n.a. = data not available 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4.  DAK Allocation per Sector in Kabupaten Gorontalo and 
Kabupaten Kupang, 2005–2007 (million rupiah) 
 
Sector  Kabupaten Gorontalo  Kabupaten Kupang 
  2005 2006 2007 2005 2006 2007 
 Education 4,190 7,270 14,415 4,210 7,310 15,950 
 Health 2,280 6,810 10,519 2,180 6,300 12,054 
 Infrastructure 5,590 11,710 21,727 5,750 9,280 17,152 
 (a) Roads 2,650 8,530 15,930 2,940 6,070 10,727 
 (b) Irrigation 2,260 1,370 2,667 2,050 1,560 3,108 
 (c) Clean water 680 1,810 3,130 760 1,650 3,317 
 Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 1,040 2,340 3,922 1,390 2,780 3,772 
 Agriculture 1,120 3,390 4,127 1,130 4,090 5,825 
 Regional Government infrastructure 0 0 0 4,000 3,000 2,680 
 The Environment n.a. 310 834 n.a. 310 862 
Source: SIKD of Ministry of Finance (2007) 
Note: n.a. = data not available 
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Appendix 5.  Rankings from Results of FGD Participants Evaluation of the 
Stages in the Use of DAK  
Note: 1 = The highest satisfaction; 6 = Dissatisfied/the lowest satisfaction 
 
 
A. Kabupaten Kupang 
Ranking No. Stage 
Transparancy Accountability Participation 
Overall 
Ranking 
1 Planning 4 3 1 3 
2 Determination of project location 3 2 3 2 
3 Funds disbursement 1 1 4 1 
4 Project implementation 2 4 2 4 
5 Monitoring and evaluation 6 6 6 6 
6 Coordination 5 5 5 5 
 
B. Kabupaten Wonogiri 
Ranking No. Stage 
Transparancy Accountability Participation 
Overall 
Ranking 
1 Planning 4 5 3 4 
2 Determination of project location  2 2 1 2 
3 Funds disbursement 5 3 5 5 
4 Project implementation 1 1 2 1 
5 Monitoring and evaluation 6 6 6 6 
6 Coordination 3 4 3 3 
 
C. Kabupaten Gorontalo 
Ranking No. Stage 
Transparancy Accountability Participation 
Overall 
Ranking 
1 Planning 5 4 3 5 
2 Determination of project location  3 3 5 3 
3 Funds disbursement 1 1 1 1 
4 Project implementation 2 2 2 2 
5 Monitoring and evaluation 4 5 4 4 
6 Coordination 6 6 6 6 
 
D. Kota Banda Aceh 
Ranking No. Stage 
Transparancy Accountability Participation 
Overall 
Ranking 
1 Planning 6 6 6 6 
2 Determination of project location  3 5 5 5 
3 Funds disbursement 2 2 1 2 
4 Project implementation 1 1 2 1 
5 Monitoring and evaluation 5 3 4 3 
6 Coordination 4 4 3 4 
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Appendix 6. Allocation of the Specific Allocation Fund (Article 54 of Government Regulation No. 55/2005) 
 
Determination of Recipient Regions                                                                                Determination Process for Amount of DAK  
 
 
(General Criteria)                                Yes                                                                  (Technical Criteria) 
Fiscal Capacity (NFI<1)                                                                                              Technical Weighting (BT) = IT x IKK 
 
 
 
(Specific Criteria): Papua Special 
Autonomy & Disadvantaged Regions                                                     DAK Weighting = f(BD,BT) 
 
                                                             Yes 
 
(Specific Criteria) 
Regional Characteristics Index           Eligible Regions                                                                                DAK Allocation (IKW) 
 
 
 
Fiscal and Regional Index (IFW) =  
f(IFN, IKW)                                                                                                                         Regional Weighting (BD) = IFW x IKK 
 
 
                                      No        Yes                 Fiscal and Regional Index (IFW) = f(IFN, IKW) 
Ineligible                              IFW<1 
 
 
Source: Technical Guidelines for DAK in the Education Sector 2007 (Ministry of National Education Regulation No. 4/2007) 
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Appendix 7.  Distribution Mechanisms for DAK in the Education Sector, 2007 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Directorate-General of Primary and Secondary Education Management Circular, Ministry of National Education  
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
                 : Line of command                                       
              : Line of 
coordination 
 
Bupati/mayors submit 
the definitive plan to 
their local Regional 
Office of the 
Directorate-General of 
Treasury, Ministry of 
Finance 
 
Bupati/Mayors open a 
special account to hold the 
Specific Allocation Fund 
(DAK) 
 
Bupati/Mayors submit the 
DAK payment order 
(SPP) 
APBD Co-funding 
(minimum of 10% of DAK 
allocation) added to the 
DAK transfer, and 
general expenses (3%), 
bupati/mayor determines 
and distributes DAK fund 
to schools 
School/madrasa principal 
implements DAK activities 
 
School/madrasa committee 
District/city education office, 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
education council 
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Appendix 8. Mechanisms for the Use and Implementation of DAK 
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Project implementer 
 = SRAA and technical guidelines 
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Appendix 9. Reporting Mechanisms for DAK in the Education Sector  
 
 
 
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
 
 
 
Ministry of Finance attn. 
Director-General of Budgets 
and Fiscal Balance 
Minister of National Education 
to be actioned by Directorate-
General of Junior and 
Secondary Education 
Management  
Head of the local Regional 
Office of Treasury, Ministry 
of Finance 
Governor attn. head of 
provincial education 
office 
Directorate-General of 
Islamic Religious 
Institutions, Ministry of 
Religion  
Director of Religion and 
Education, Bappenas Bupati/mayor attn. head of 
education office, district/city 
office of the Ministry of Religion  
School/madras
a principal 
 : Reporting line 
 : Line of coordination  
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Appendix 10. Reporting Mechanisms for DAK in the Health Sector  
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
            
 
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
Minister for Finance attn. 
Director-General of Budgets 
and Fiscal Balance  
Minister for Health attn. 
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Ministry of Health  
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of Finance 
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: Reporting line 
: Line of coordination 
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Appendix 11. Mechanisms for the Distribution of DAK from the Center to 
the Regions  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*surat perintah membayar
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bupati/mayor/ 
regional office 
issues payment 
order (SPM*) 
Directorate-General of 
Treasury, Ministry of 
Finance 
Regional Office of 
Treasury, Ministry of 
Finance 
National Treasury Office 
(KPPN) issues remittance 
instruction (SP2D) 
Bank 
Project implementer 
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Appendix 12. Photo of a “Royal: Special School Edition”  
Typewriter, as Part of the 2006 DAK Package 
 
 
 
 
 
 
